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Introduction

Hoping to entrap Jesus in a political thicket, the lawyers of His
day came to Him with a thorny question involving the relationship
between church and state. "Teacher," they asked, "is it lawful to
pay taxes to Caesar, or not? Should we pay them, or should we
not?"' The question, while advanced out of insincere motives, 2 was
doubtless a very real dilemma for religious leaders at that time. Approval of tax payment would have offended the nationalistic parties
while disapproval would have been seen as disloyalty to Rome.
Christ's challenge to His questioners to examine more closely the
image on the coin set up His famous, enigmatic answer: "Render
to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are
3
God's."
Church-state relations continue to be a touchy issue today, especially, it seems, when money is at stake. The question for first
century Palestine concerned the proper approach for the church to
take with respect to the state, in that case an occupying power. The
dilemma for twentieth century America is the striking reverse image: What is the proper policy of the state toward religion? Just as
theologians have wrestled with Jesus' terse admonition, courts and
commentators have agonized over the lean language of the first
amendment governing the relationship between religion and polity:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-

gion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

.

...

4

The troubling

questions concerning a believer's obligations to the secular state
mirror the difficult issues which confront the state when it strives to
be "neutral" with respect to religious belief and exercise: When
does some government policy place an improper burden on reliI Mark 12:13-14.
2 Mark 12:13. Compare the accounts given in the other synoptic gospels. Luke
records the question as put to Jesus by "spies" for the scribes and chief priests, who hoped
to "take hold of what He said, so as to deliver Him up to the authority and jurisdiction of
the governor." Luke 20:19-20. Matthew also is explicit in saying the question was a contrivance, hoping "to entangle Him in His talk." M'atthew 22:15.
3 Mark 12:17.
4 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
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gious exercise, when does a policy bestow an impermissible benefit
on religion, and when, if ever, does it do neither?
Jesus' answer might validly be read as choosing neither of the
divisive options His interrogators had in mind, but instead as attacking the premises behind the purported dilemma. A similar approach should be considered in answering the supposed dilemma
of the first amendment religion clauses: It is time to reject the
widely-accepted premise that the establishment and free exercise
clauses are in "tension" with each other and affirm instead that the
two clauses are but two sides of the same coin, a coin which represents a single "value" in our constitutional democracy-religious
freedom. A close look at that coin may provide the way out of the
establishment clause trap which has ensnared the Supreme Court
for the past 40 years and reveal a cogent framework for analyzing
the constitutionality both of Caesar's demands for tribute and the
dispensation of the Empire's largesse to religious persons and
groups.
The central thesis of this article is that the establishment clause
protects religious liberty; it safeguards much the same interests as the
free exercise clause, but in a slightly different way. The free exercise clause defines the important individual liberty of religious freedom 5 while the establishment clause addresses the limits of allowable
state classifications affecting this liberty. The two clauses, naturally
enough, address a single, central value from two different angles:
The free exercise clause forbids government proscription; the establishment clause forbids government prescription. 6 Stated narrowly,
government can neither keep persons from exercising certain religious beliefs nor may it make them exercise any religion.
But each clause is entitled to a somewhat broader reading: Not
only may the state not prohibit free exercise, it may not penalize or
unduly burden it either. Not only must the state refrain from man5 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979) ("The values
enshrined in the First Amendment plainly rank high 'in the scale of our national values.' ");
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("The values underlying [the free exercise
clause] have been zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of
admittedly high social importance."); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("The place of religion in our society is an exalted one .... "); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being.").
6 This is the position the Court took in the first religion clause "incorporation" case,
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The constitutional inhibition ... has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship. . . . On the other hand, it safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion."). The position taken in this article agrees with
Cantwell against the following dictum in Abington Township, 374 U.S. at 223: "The distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended."
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dating any exercise of religion, it also may not place the exercise of
any religion or group of religions in a preferred position. Thus, a
broad free exercise right bars government inhibition, deterrence,
or discrimination; a broad establishment clause right bars religious
coercion, inducement, or, once again, discrimination-inone direction or the other. As each clause commands a progressively
broader interpretation, the two may be seen as protecting interests
in religious freedom that completely converge, not that conflict.
The point of convergence is the principle of equality of religious liberty.
All of this might seem to belabor the obvious were it not for
the fact that, for the last forty years or so (and sporadically in the
last few Terms), the Supreme Court has treated the establishment
clause as if it enshrined a unique right to complain that tax dollars
are spent (or not collected) in sensitive areas rather than about how
such government policies might affect freedoms of religious exercise or nonexercise. Accordingly, the Court has frequently promoted "separation" of church and state at the expense of the often
competing principle of "neutrality" or equality. Moreover, the
Court's failure to read the establishment clause as embodying a
principle of religious liberty has led to a doctrinal collision with
contemporary understanding of the free exercise clause. The resulting tensions-if not outright contradictions-in the Court's decisions are thus the inevitable byproduct of an analysis which
considers strict separation of church and state necessary to prevent
"an establishment of religion" while simultaneously insisting that
the state provide the degree of religious accommodation necessary
to assure "the free exercise thereof." 7 As a result, the religion
clauses have been transformed into dual monsters lurking on either
side of a narrow channel of constitutionality, rather than twin mani8
festations of an identical principle.
The Supreme Court's reading of the religion clauses is completely indefensible-historically, textually, and practically. Part II
of this article traces the historical 9 and conceptual' 0 errors which
have plagued the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine
7

See, e.g., Walz v.Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has strug-

gled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in
absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash
with the other."); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-1, at 812 (1978); Pfeffer,
Freedom and/or Separation: The ConstitutionalDilemma of the FirstAmendment, 64 MINN. L. REV.

561 (1980).
8 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("By
broadly construing both Clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the channel between
the Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or federal action must pass in order to
survive constitutional scrutiny."). As argued below, the tension exists not because the
clauses have been construed broadly but because they have been construed wrongly.
9
10

See text accompanying notes 35-58 infra.
See text accompanying notes 18-34, 59-71 infra.
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generally and which have led the Court to read the establishment
and free exercise clauses as competing, and often contradictory,
principles, producing a schizophrenic pattern of decisions."1 As an
alternative to the defects of present analysis, Part III argues that the
religion clauses should be considered together and understood as advancing fundamentally similar interests. 12 This approach points to a
new model for establishment clause adjudication: The equal protection of the free exercise of religion.'3 Part IV develops this new model by
proposing a major alteration-but not a complete abandonmentof the Court's present three-part establishment clause test of a statute's constitutionality.' 4 Finally, in Part V, this model is applied to
some of the major establishment clause cases decided by the
Supreme Court in the past three years (including the important
17
Wallace v. Jaffree 15 and Aguilar v. Felton' 6 decisions of last Term),
illustrating how a new approach might resolve the embarrassing inconsistencies generated by the Supreme Court's present doctrine.
II.

Forty Years in the Wilderness: A Legacy
of Conceptual Errors
A.

The Confusing Contours of the Case Law
For nearly four decades 18 the Supreme Court has meandered
through the province of church-state relations, leaving behind a
serpentine trail of constitutionality. In establishment clause cases,
a three-part test has served as the Court's "guide."' 9 At first blush,
this test-first set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman 2 0 -appears straightforward: To be upheld, a statute or regulation (1) must have a secular
legislative purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster ex21
cessive state entanglement with religion.
Application of these three "standards," however, has charted a
I1 See text accompanying notes 22-34 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 72-96 infra.
13 This model will provide for the equal protection of the "nonexercise" of religion as
well, the freedom of "nonexercise" being merely a special case of the free exercise of religion. See text accompanying notes 115-16 infra.
14 See text accompanying notes 97-172 infra.
15 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985).
16 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
17 See text accompanying notes 173-260 infra.
18 Since Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), that is. See text accompanying
notes 39-51 infra.
19 The Supreme Court itself has called this "test" a mere "signpost." See Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
20 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21 Id. at 612-13 (citing Board ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
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long and winding road, bewildering even to those for whom the
landmarks are familiar: Large property tax exemptions for
churches are appropriately secular and nonentangling 2 2 while
small-scale tax "credit" schemes reimbursing parents of private
school children for some portion of secular educational expenses
have too great a religious "effect." 23 "Deduction" schemes (as subtly distinguished from "credit" schemes) nonetheless have been upheld against establishment clause challenge. 2 4 The Court has held
direct financial grants to religious schools unconstitutional when intended to be used as salary supplements for teachers 25 or when
used for maintenance and repair of buildings, 26 but it has also held
construction grants constitutional where the buildings involved
were restricted to "secular uses."

27

The Court has found it uncon-

stitutional for a state to reimburse private religious schools for the
cost of textbooks and instructional materials, 2 8 but constitutional
for a state to permit parents of children attending private schools to
take a tax deduction for the same expenses 2 9 or for the state to loan
the textbooks directly to the students.3 0 The Justices have struck
down religious education in public school classrooms, 3 ' yet they
have upheld "released-time" programs to allow for religious education away from school grounds. 32 What is perhaps most perplexing, though the Lemon test would appear to bar aid to persons solely
on account of their religious beliefs, the Court has found that the
state must provide unemployment compensation to persons who
33
leave their jobs for sincerely-held, but purely religious, reasons.
This scatter-pattern of decisions is the combined product of
22 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
23 Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
24 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
25 Lemon, 403 U.S. 602.
26 Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756.
27 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
28 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609, 621.
29 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 402 n.10. See text accompanying notes 199-208 infra.
30 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court has, however, found the
lending of other materials, such as maps and tape recorders, as unconstitutional as their
outright provision. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (provision of maps and tape
recorders to nonpublic schools held unconstitutional); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977) (lending, rather than providing, such materials struck down, but provision of certain
"auxiliary" services upheld). A further catalog of contradictions in the Court's school aid
cases is presented by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Wallace v.Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479,
2508, 2518-19 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
32 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
33 Thomas v Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
The Court's decision in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985), creates a
further anomaly: The state must, at least for purposes of unemployment compensation,
treat failure to accommodate an employee's sabbath as an unjustified dismissal, yet the state
may not pass a law to prevent such dismissals.
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the tripartite Lemon test and the Court's occasional desire to provide an escape from the straitjacket that an honest application of
Lemon would force upon society in its attempts to accommodate
religion. 34 Obviously, the Lemon test has not made for very predictable adjudication. More fundamentally, the test itself is premised
on an underlying view of the establishment clause which is both
historically unjustified and textually incoherent.
B. A Mistaken Point of Departure
In large part, the conceptual defects of present establishment
clause doctrine can be traced to the rather uncomfortable "incorporation" of the establishment clause through the fourteenth
amendment as a check on the power of the states. 35 The original
36
intention behind the establishment clause, as explained below,
seems fairly clearly to have been to forbid establishment of a national religion and to prevent federal interference with a state's
choice of whether or not to have an official state religion.3 7 Such an
intention does not "incorporate" well as a limitation on state government. (Indeed, to the extent that the Framers drafted the establishment clause to address concerns of federalism, it makes no
more sense to "incorporate" it against the states than it does to
incorporate the other provisions in the Bill of Rights which are federalism-oriented. 38 ) Undaunted, the Supreme Court forced a
34 Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court completely ignored the three-part Lemon test and reached a result inconsistent with a fair application of that test). See text accompanying notes 91-96, 137 infra.
35 L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-2, at 814 n.5. See note 6 supra and note 40 infra.
36 See text accompanying notes 52-71 infra.
37 R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FicTION 14-15 (1982); M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 22 (1965) (collecting sources). See L. TRIBE,
supra note 7, § 14-2, at 814 n.5., 816-19; Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 9 (1978) ("The
states had not forfeited, by the promulgation of the amendment, any of their rights to establish a state religion or to afford preferences to one religious sect over others."). For
example, New Hampshire maintained an official established religion until 1817, Connecticut until 1818, and Massachusetts until 1833. R. CORD, supra, at 14; E. MORGAN, THE BIRTH
OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-1789, at 96-97 (rev. ed. 1977). See also notes 50-51 infra and accompaning text.
38 For example, the second and tenth amendments, and arguably the ninth, are explicitly concerned with questions of federalism. There is also historical evidence which suggests that the adopters of the fourteenth amendment did not believe that that amendment
had made the establishment clause applicable to the states. This evidence consists mainly
of the negative inferences created by the rejection of the proposed "Blaine Amendment," 4
CONG. REC. 5580 (1876), which, shortly after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
would have added to the first amendment that "[n]o state shall make any law respecting an
establishment of religion." See L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-2, at 814 n.5.; M. HOWE, supra
note 37, at 102. See generally Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949); and sources cited in Cord,
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square historical peg into a round doctrinal hole by filing off a few
of the more inconvenient sharp edges of history. The revisionist
version emerged as law in the leading case of Everson v. Board of
39
Education.
In Everson, the Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, upheld the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute providing free bus rides to children
attending public or private (including religious) schools. Curiously,
there seemed to be no dispute among the Justices over whether the
fourteenth amendment "incorporated" the establishment clause
but only over what an incorporated establishment clause meant as
applied to the facts of the Everson case. 40 Equally perplexing, both
the majority and the dissenters placed heavy reliance upon the
views of Thomas Jefferson and, secondarily, on those of James
Madison concerning the issue of religious establishments in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. 41 These state-oriented views formed
the basic historical context for the Everson Court's interpretation of
the federal establishment clause's content and scope.
Certainly, the experience in Virginia was crucial to the formation of the respective views of Jefferson and Madison. Certainly,
their views, especially Madison's, greatly influenced the debate concerning adoption of the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution
several years later. But the Court in Everson was quite simply wrong
in equating these views with those of all "freedom-loving colonials"
and concluding that "[i]t was these feelings which found expression
Church-State Separation: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of the First Amendment, 9 HARV. J.
OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 131 n.10 (1986).
39 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Cf.note 6 supra.
40 330 U.S. at 15 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment [has been] interpreted to make the
prohibitions of the First applicable to state actions abridging religious freedom. There is
every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the 'establishment of
religion' clause.") (footnote omitted).
Nor did the dissenters quarrel with the majority's sweeping statement regarding the
scope of such incorporation:
[Tihe "establishment of religion" clause ... means at least this: Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organization or groups and vice versa. In the words ofJefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between church and State."
Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted). See also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961) (Everson dissenters did not challenge Court's interpretation of establishment clause as too broad;
rather they challenged its application as too narrow).
41 330 U.S. at 11-13.
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in the First Amendment." 4 2 Such a move makes two errors simultaneously. First, it too closely equates the personal views of certain
men with the meaning of the constitutional provision which they
helped draft, a provision which underwent important revisions and
which was voted on and ratified by a large and diverse collection of
state ratifying assemblies. Second, it wrongly assumes that the
views animating a state constitutional provision after which the lan-

guage of a part of the federal Bill of Rights was patterned corresponded to the intended meaning of the national provision.43 In
looking beyond the historically limited intention of the Framers for
a broader "core meaning" to the establishment prohibition, the
Court looked to the views of certain Framers on church-state relations generally (often as expressed in their views on state law),
rather than to how those with disparate views came to agree on a
narrow provision restricting the power of the national
44
government.
The assumption of unanimity of opinion among the Framers is
badly mistaken. In fact, the Framers had widely divergent understandings of the meaning and objectives of "separation." While
Jefferson viewed separation primarily as a way to protect the state
from the influence of religion, 4 5 another influential position, based
on the thought of Roger Williams, 4 6 viewed separation chiefly as a
42 Id. at 11.
43 See M. HOWE, supra note 37, at 3 (The Court's concentration on Virginia "forced a
continental complexity of theory, practice, and faith into such a confining frame of reference as to make impossible anything more significant than a parochial gloss on Jefferson's
metaphor."); id. at 172 (The Justices made the "historically quite misleading assumption
that the same considerations which moved Jefferson and Madison to favor separation of
church and state in Virginia led the nation to demand the religious clauses of the First
Amendment.").
44 SeeJ. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 16-17 (1980).
Ely emphasizes that, since the intention of the "ratifiers" should be given as much weight as
the intention of an amendment's "proposers," the language which they agreed upon is more
important than the views of any of the agreeing parties as to the "meaning" of that
language.
One of the reasons the debate culminates in a vote on an authoritative text is to
generate a record ofjust what there was sufficient agreement on to gain majority
consent .... [T]he only reliable evidence of what the ratifiers thought they were
ratifying is the language of the provision they approved.
Id. at 17. See also Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985). Interestingly, the more credit one gives to the role of state ratifying assemblies in
adopting the first amendment, the harder it is to justify reading its provisions in terms of
only one state's viewpoint. A Virginian perspective can be accorded no greater weight than
that of other states which ratified the amendment. See notes 37 and 43 supra; cf. M. HOWE,
supra note 37, at 10 (The Court's basic historical error was "its pretension that the framers
spoke in a whollyJeffersonian dialect and that those who ratified [the religion clauses] fully
understood that style of speech.").
45 TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-3, at 817.
46 Id. See also M. HOWE, supra note 37, at 5-11 (1965); W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY
153-224 (1985).
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means of keeping the true Faith "pure" from state adulteration;
and Madison felt that separation was necessary to foster equality
among religions in the eyes of the state. 4 7 For Madison, separation
was a principle of nonfavoritism and noninvolvement, part and parcel of the properly restricted role of limited republican governments generally. 48 Each of these three major schools of thought on
church-state relations was compatible with an establishment clause
designed only to leave free from national interference a state's
choice among these-or other-views.
The schemes of religious liberty existing in state constitutions,
including Virginia's, were often very much different from those established by the United States Constitution. 4 9 Clearly, there was no
unanimity of opinion on the proper relationship between church
and state, a point that even the majority of the Everson Court conceded: Many states maintained established churches at the time
they ratified the first amendment and "[a]lmost every colony exacted some kind of tax for church support." 50 The establishment/disestablishment controversy was a hotly contested and
deeply divisive issue in the states. Virginia's answer to the question
differed markedly from that of Massachusetts, where an official state
47 Cf.TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-3, at 817. See note 48 infra.
48 W. MILLER, supra note 46, at 111-17. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 & 51, at
53-62, 335-41 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1941). Attempts to fit Madison's views on religious
freedom into the larger framework of his political theory can be somewhat overdrawn, see,
e.g., W. MILLER, supra, at 79-150, though Madison himself is partially to blame, by virtue of
his famous analogy in Federalist51: "In a free government the security for civil rights must
be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of
interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra, at
339-40. It can be observed, though, that Madison felt that excessive and undesirable concentrations of power were both the greatest threat to individual liberty and best checked by
individual liberty. For Madison, there was clearly a structuralcomponent to liberty. While
combinations of sects into powerful establishments were likely harmful to religious liberty,
the natural and sufficient way for government to prevent such harm would be, consistent
with Madison's thought, to assure equal religious liberty to all; a "free market" in religious
ideals, free from government interference, would in the end itself prove the best guarantor
of religious liberty. See also note 110 infra.
49 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629, 637 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (Provisions in contemporaneous state constitutions "cannot furnish a guide concerning the understanding of the harmony of such provisions with the Establishment Clause. . ... [T]he
regime of religious liberty embodied in state constitutions was very different from that established by the Constitution of the United States."); M. HowE, supra note 37, at 2. Virginia's proposed amendment to the United States Constitution (following the ratification
debates) was, in fact, markedly different from its state constitutional provision: "[Al men
have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to
the dictates of conscience, and ...no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored
or established, by law, in preference to others." 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTrruTION 659 (1891). North Carolina suggested identical language and New York and
Rhode Island proposed substantially similar language. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479, 2508-10 & n.2 (1985) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
50 Everson, 330 U.S. at 10 n.8. "Maryland permitted taxation for support of the Christian religion and limited civil office to Christians until 1818 ....
Id. at 14 n.17.
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religion was not disestablished until 1833.51
It is against this historical backdrop of different theories of religious liberty and different state approaches to the question of religious establishments that the language of the first amendment must
be viewed. Completing this backdrop is the historical impetus for a
national Bill of Rights in the first place. The Bill of Rights, of
course, was not in the original constitutional script but was included as an afterword to assuage antifederalist fears that the new
national government would encroach on individual liberties and,
equally important, state prerogatives. 5 2 Madison thought such
fears nonsensical and redundant given a federal government of limited, delegated powers. For example, the national government
plainly could not establish an official religion because the Constitution nowhere empowered it to do so. Moreover, Madison worried,
reducing certain liberties to writing might wrongly be understood
53
as reducing the rights of the people merely to those thus written.
Pragmatism triumphed over political theory and in the First
Congress Madison proposed twelve amendments, the third of
which passed the House reading as follows: "[C]ongress shall make
no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof,
or to infringe the rights of conscience." 54 This amendment passed
the Senate in slightly different form5 5 and a conference committee
produced the final language: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . ." The change which added
the term "respecting" was neither unimportant nor incidental, but
was designed to prevent the drawing of a negative inference of governmental power; namely, that an explicit prohibition only of the
power to establish a church might leave open the possibility that
Congress could disestablish state churches. 56 Several of the amend51 See note 37 supra. And, as noted above, even Virginia's proposed amendment to the
federal constitution did not go nearly so far as did its own state constitution in pressing for
strict separation. See note 49 supra; cf. text accompanying note 74 infra.
52 G.WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 536-43 (1969);
Note, The Origins and Original Significance of theJust Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
94 YALE L.J. 694, 714 (1985). See generally Storing, What The Anti-Federalists Were For, introduction to I THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (H. Storing ed. 1975); B. SCHWARTZ, THE
GREAT RGrrs OF MANKIND 67-91 (1977) (detailing provisions of rights in state
constitutions).

53 See Kurland, supra note 37, at 13; W. MILLER, supra note 46, at 119-20;J. ELY, supra
note 44, at 35 (quoting 1787 letter from Madison tojefferson). See also THE FEDERALIST No.
84, at 555-67 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1941).
54 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 766 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789); Kurland, supra note 37, at 8.
55 Kurland, supra note 37, at 9. The Senate version read as follows: "Congress shall
make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free
exercise of religion .... ." Id. at 9 & n.39.
56 This is consonant with Madison's concern that a Bill of Rights not unwittingly enlarge the powers of the national government or diminish the rights of individuals. See text
accompanying note 53 supra. See also 2 J.STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
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ment's proponents had originally preferred a version which de57
clared that Congress could "make no laws touching religion" to
make it clear that the national government was simply to have no
power in this area. 58
C. An Inheritance of Incoherence
The contemporary application of the establishment clause inherits two main problems from this history. First, by choosing
among Framers' views that in practice conflict as often as coincide, 5 9 the Supreme Court has reached results as inconsistent as the
choice of views. Given the close historical and personal relationship between Jefferson and Madison, especially during the formative period of Virginia's guarantees of religious freedom, the Court
has not realized the full extent to which Jeffersonian "separation"
and Madisonian "neutrality" can be at war with one another. The
two men differed over many things, including the proper attitude of
government toward religion. 60 Indeed, much of the Court's inconsistent adjudication can be traced to inconsistent application of
"separation" and "neutrality" as constitutional watchwords.
The second problem is closely related to the first. The modem
Court has attached importance to the use of the word "respecting"
THE UNITED STATES 651 (5th ed. 1891) (explaining reasons for presence of ninth amend-

ment in the Bill of Rights) ("This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse
or ingenious misapplication of the well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases
implies a negation in all others; and e converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an
affirmation in all others.").
57 Kurland, supra note 37, at 8 (citing views of Representatives Huntington and
Livermore) (emphasis added).
58

See generally R. CORD, supra note 37.

59 L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-2, at 813-14 n.4.
60 Indeed, Jefferson and Madison in many respects had drastically different world
views. Jefferson was a republican/communitarian who preferred a secular religion for all
and abandonment of sectarian tendencies, whereas Madison was a federalist/liberal who
wanted to protect individual liberty and healthy pluralism against temporary majorities of
the community. See Note, supra note 52, at 705 n.57 (Madison attacked Jefferson's belief
that all individuals in a society have similar interests and feelings.); R. MCCARTHY, J. SKILLEN & W. HARPER, DISESTABLISHMENT A SECOND TIME-GENUINE PLURALISM FOR AMERICAN

SCHOOLS 15-29 (1982) (Jefferson's republican vision influenced his views on the proper role
of religion.); id. at 27 (Jefferson favored a universal, community religion which could only
flourish if the peculiar dogmas of sects were kept out of the public realm.); see, e.g., M.
HOWE, supra note 37, at 61 (Madison opposed Jefferson's proposal for clergy disqualification in Virginia "as a denial of religious liberty, an impairment of equality, and an establishment of religion .... "); McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 623-24 (plurality opinion) (striking down
Tennessee clergy disqualification law) (Madison vigorously disagreed with Jefferson on the
clergy disqualification issue. The Constitution is more reflective of the Madisonian view.);
accord M. HOWE, supra note 37, at 2 (Jefferson's understanding of separation reflects the
anticlerical bias of eighteenth century rationalism.); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-3, at 81617.
For a superb and revealing treatment of the idiosyncracies of Jefferson's political
thought, see G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978).
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in the establishment clause, but has drawn precisely the wrong inference from it. Not only is an officially established religion prohibited, says today's Court, but the prohibition is "far more
extensive." 6 ' As ChiefJustice Burger stated for the Court in Lemon,
"[a] given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be
one 'respecting' that end in the sense of being a step that could lead
to such establishment . ... 62
Nothing could wrench text further from context. The Supreme
Court's ahistorical exegesis has changed a rule of no national religious establishment and laissezfaire with respect to the states into a
rule of strict and thoroughgoing separation of religion and polity,
now equally applicable to the states. The Court has incorporated as
monolithic "original intent" the position of only one party to a compromise, and it has done so on a mistaken reading of the term "respecting" as broadening the prohibition in accordance with the
extreme Jeffersonian view, rather than narrowing it for reasons of
federalism.
To be sure, the doctrinal gymnastics of selective incorporation
have removed the specific federalism limitation of the original intention, but it does not follow that such incorporation can also
change the meaning of the word "respecting" so as to expand not
only the applicability of the establishment clause (to states, as well
as the federal government) but the sweep of its prohibition as well
(to make unconstitutional many types of government action not
previously thought unconstitutional). If the incorporation of the
establishment clause is indeed afait accompli,63 historical intention
and design still must continue to constrain what kind of establishment clause judges can, with a straight face, "incorporate" as a restriction on government power at all levels. The collective
intention of the Adopters should be honored insofar as they understood the two religion clauses to be "at least compatible and at best
mutually supportive." 64
The perspective attributed to Jefferson fails miserably on this
score. The continued application of this view-a view emphasizing
"separation" even at the expense of "neutrality"-is irreconcilable
61 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (plurality opinion).
62 403 U.S. at 612 (emphasis in original). See also Abington Township, 374 U.S. at 217
(quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32) (broader purpose of clause "to uproot all such relationships... forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion").
63 Kurland, supra note 37, at 11. That it is impossible to "unincorporate" the establishment clause was recently brought home to one maverick federal judge. Jaffree v. James,
544 F. Supp. 727 (1982) (Hand, CJ.) (holding that "the establishment clause of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution does not bar the state from establishing a
religion"), rev'd (and scolded) sub nom. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1984),
afd, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985) (reaffirming incorporation of establishment clause).
64 L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-2, at 814.
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with the contemporary understanding of the free exercise clause, 65
and should be abandoned, not because the free exercise principle
"trumps" the establishment clause, but because it makes little textual or historical sense to read the two clauses as conflicting in the
66
first place.
A better approach focuses on the religious liberty protected by
the establishment clause. Recognizing that the establishment
clause "right" is essentially one of equal treatment with respect to
religious belief or nonbelief, exercise or nonexercise, produces results which are both more consistent with the free exercise clause
and more consonant with the first amendment's history than are the
results of any other proposed theory. Moreover, if the fourteenth
amendment is thought of as incorporating liberties or rights rather
than "clauses" per se, the "selective incorporation" of the religion
clauses as a unified package of personal religious freedoms becomes, as a doctrinal matter, less problematic. 6 7 Accordingly, it is
65 For example, Jefferson's beliefs that clergy should be prohibited from holding public
office and that churches should be kept away from political discourse are emphatically rejected today. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (Forums for public expression,
like state university buildings, must be made available to religious groups on an equal basis
with other organizations.); Wah, 397 U.S. at 670 ("Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues including ... vigorous
advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of course, churches as much as secular bodies
...have that right."); McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 640 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The mere fact
that a purpose of the Establishment Clause is to reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness
or strife, does not place religious discussion, association, or political participation in a status less preferred than rights of discussion, association, and political participation generally.") (citations omitted).
66 Professor Tribe resolves the supposed tug-of-war between the two religion clauses in
favor of the free exercise clause, by fashioning a two-tiered definition of religion; a broad
definition for accommodating free exercise claims and a narrow understanding for purposes of establishment clause analysis. L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-6, at 826-28, 831; see id.
§ 14-7, at 834. Courts and commentators alike have rightly critized this approach as introducing a distinction wholly alien to the constitutional text. SeeJaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d
1526, 1531 (11th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Merel, The Protectionof Individual
Choice: A Consistent Understandingof Religion Under the FirstAmendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805,
806 (1978) ("definitional approach at least as unsatisfactory as the bifurcated theory of the
two clauses on which it is premised").
On the other hand, Professor Kurland's "strict neutrality" approach, P. KURLAND,
RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962), while purporting to apply a neutral principle of equality of
treatment to both clauses, in effect favors the anti-establishment prohibition "at a cost of
almost total emasculation of the free exercise provision." Merel, supra, at 808. This article
argues that the need is less to resolve any tug-of-war in favor of one clause or another than
to untie the doctrinal knots that have unnecessarily caused the tension.
67 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The fundamental concept of
liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment."). See also Wallace v.Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2486-87 (1985) (quoting
Cantwell with approval). See M. HOWE, supra note 37, at 108 (The Court's exegesis in
Cantwell, the first religion clause "incorporation" case, read the establishment clause as
"something far less radical than a banning of all forms of aid to religion. The prohibition
was read merely as a ban on a particularspecies of infringement of religious liberty. Given that
restrictive meaning, there were, of course, no logical difficulties in the Court's assumption
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proposed here that the establishment clause is best understood as
68
providing for the equal protection of the free exercise of religion.
It should not be entirely surprising if such a reading proves in
practice to be fairly close to Madison's own views. After all,
Madison was the most important draftsman and sponsor of the religion clauses. This is not simply the product of a different choice
among various Framers' views (such as the Supreme Court made
initially in rushing to adopt the Jeffersonian position in Everson 69 ),
though even as such it would possess a stronger historical claim to
legitimacy.70 Rather, a Madisonian "neutrality" more closely comports with the language, structure, and, crucially, the internal cothat the liberties secured by the Fourteenth Amendment included each variety of religious
liberty ....")(emphasis added).
68 It is not contended that the approach urged here is textually or historically demonstrable, only that it is both textually and historically defensible in a way that present religion clause
jurisprudence is not. Other interpretations of the Constitution's text and history are obviously possible. The indeterminacy of the text and the even greater ambiguity of the history
and intention behind that text do not admit of claims to a "definitive" interpretation.
Clearly, however, some interpretations are better (or at least less foolish) than others, and
the criterion for making these judgments is the compatability of the proffered interpretation with the following (in order of importance): (1) text (including internal coherence and
overall constitutional structure), (2) intention (as informed by the study of history), and (3)
/
precedent (insofar as practicable).
The methodological premises on which this article rests are thus both "interpretivist"
and, in a sense, "conservative." "Interpretivism" as used here denotes approaches to constitutional interpretation which accord primacy to the text, history,, and structure of the
document being interpreted. This is not to be confused with legal "conservativism," which
is used here to express an incremental, approach to changes in the state of the law, giving
due weight to both stare decisis and "settled" doctrine. Both interpretivism and conservativism can be grouped, somewhat loosely, under the much-abused label "judicial restraint,"
as each involves the principle of deference to the views of other actors in the constitutional
decisionmaking process, be they "the Framers," earlier generations of the Judiciary, or coordinate branches of government.
Interpretivism must be accommodated to judicial conservativism (and vice versa) to
achieve true judicial restraint. An interpretivism that ignores all precedent in favor of original intention invites wild swings in the state of constitutional law with the advent of each
new revisionist history (and perhaps each new revisionist Justice). On the other hand, undue devotion to stare decisis can be little more than the narrow-minded stubbornness of
one proceeding down the road more travelled, regardless of how far astray from first principles of text, history, and structure that path leads. It would be a mistake to call either
approach, standing alone, "judicial restraint."
The text and history of the religion clauses can be accommodated to present doctrine,
using a combination of the textual and historical methods of the pure "interpretivist" and
the analogic approach of more pragmatic "conservatives." In this article, the establishment
clause is interpreted in a way that is better in accord with history, and far better in accord
with the internal coherence of a text that includes the free exercise clause side-by-side with
the establishment clause, than are other interpretations. This interpretation, however, departs from other possible "interpretivist" approaches in that it endeavors to take seriously
the Court's "three-pronged" Lemon test and thus aims at doctrinal reformation rather than
repudiation.
69 330 U.S. at 16, 18.
70 See Wallace v. Jafree, 105 S.Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Madison "had
two advantages over Jefferson in this regard: he was present in the United States, and he
was a leading member of the First Congress.").

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:311

herence of the provisons actually adopted, in a way that Jefferson's
metaphor of a "wall of separation" between church and state sim71
ply cannot.
III.

In Search of New Doctrine: Neutrality and Equal Protection

The idea of equality of treatment with respect to fundamental
rights is one with a long and distinguished pedigree, especially in
the case of the establishment clause. Madison himself powerfully
expressed the principle of equality of treatment with respect to religious freedom in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. Madison argued that the levying of taxes for the
support of an official state religion
violates that equality which ought to be the basis of every law
... .Above all are [persons] to be considered as retaining an
"equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of conscience."
A just government . . . will be best supported by protecting
every citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same
equal hand which protects his person and his property; by
neither invading the equal rights72of any Sect, nor suffering any
Sect to invade those of another.
Although the Remonstrance has been cited for the proposition
that tax dollars should not be used in any manner which inures to
the benefit of religion, 73 Madison's polemic was directed against
the use of governmental authority in such a way as to subvert religious voluntarism and, thereby, equality. Madison's underlying philosophy held that all religions (and their adherents) must stand
before the law as equals, subject to the same rules of treatment.
This is made most clear in Madison's proposed language for the
religion clauses, language which once again emphasizes equality
and nonfavoritism: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience
71 Jefferson's well-known metaphor was penned in a short courtesy note to the Danbury
Baptist Association fourteen years after the adoption of the first amendment. The letter, at
best, is Jefferson's tendentious opinion about a constitutional provision enacted while he
was in France. See R. CORD, supra note 37, at 36-47, 120-22, 133-43; Wallace v.Jaffree, 105
S. Ct. at 2508-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72 J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprintedin Everson

v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 63, 66, 68 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting Virginia
Declaration of Rights, art. 16) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as
Remonstrance].

73 See, e.g., Wah, 397 U.S. at 700-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For extended criticism of
this view, see note 110 infra.
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be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." 74
Just shy of two centuries later, Justice John Harlan expressed
much the same vision by suggesting similarities between the establishment clause and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. "Neutrality in its application," wrote Harlan, in reference to the establishment clause, "requires an equal protection
mode of analysis. The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were; religious gerrymanders." 75 Ever since, the Court has tended to use the
language of the equal protection clause in religion cases, 76 but not
its substantive methodology. 77 Harlan's insight has been used as a
rhetorical flourish for opinions, but never developed into a framework for deciding cases.
In adjudicating first amendment issues of freedom of speech
and expression, though, the Supreme Court has borrowed freely
from the conceptual apparatus of its equal protection doctrine, focusing on the rationality and propriety of legislative classifications
which tread on those fundamental liberties. In Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosely, 78 for example, the Court struck down a statute
exempting peaceful labor picketing from a general prohibition on
picketing next to a school. The Court found that the need for content neutrality in a state's time, place, and manner regulations of
74 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 54, at 434. See also note 49 supra (discussion of Virginia's proposed amendment).
75 Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (speaking in terms of "compelling
state interest" and "least restrictive means"); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(same). Cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 362-63 n.15 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing possible "underinclusiveness" of religious exemptions from the draft and
possible "overinclusiveness" of legislation conferring benefits on religious as well as secular institutions); McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 643 (White, J., concurring) (preferring to invalidate a
law barring clergy from public office on equal protection ground rather than as religion
clause violation); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (preferring to invalidate law on equal protection rather than free exercise ground);
Merel, supra note 66, at 823 (suggesting that workable test under establishment clause
could be developed by analogy to equal protection cases); Tussman and tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 380-81 (1949) ("[O]ne of the chief criticisms of the Court's current interpretation is that it fails to read the [establishment] clause
merely as a prohibition against preferential or 'unequal' treatment of religions. Thus critics
of the Court in effect maintain that the First Amendment, as it deals with religion, must be
read as if it were an equal-protection clause.") (footnote omitted).
77 The Court's analysis under the equal protection clause focuses on the rationality and
propriety of government classifications for attaining permissible legislative goals. Certain
classifications are inherently "suspect" (paradigmatically, racial classifications and classifications affecting "fundamental" rights) and can be justified only as the least restrictive
means of fulfilling a compelling governmental interest. Other classifications are "semi-suspect" or "quasi-suspect" (paradigmatically, classifications based upon gender) and can be
justified only when "closely" related to an "important" state interest. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 670-75 (10th ed. 1980).
78 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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speech involved an "equal protection claim ... closely intertwined
with First Amendment interests. . . . [G]overnment may not grant
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but
deny its use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views . . . There is an 'equality of status in the field of
ideas.' "79
This first amendment equality principle is clearly the core element in cases of a purported "public forum." In the important case
of Widmar v. Vincent,8 0 the Supreme Court found the principle of
"equal access" applicable to religious speech as well. In Widmar,
the Court held that a state university could not deny a student
prayer and bible study group access to university facilities which
were available to otfier student groups. "[D]iscriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of a
group's intended speech," said the Court, could be justified only by
a conflicting state interest of the highest order attained by a regulation "narrowly drawn to achieve that end."8 1 Although the state's
asserted interest in preventing a possible establishment clause violation was conceded to be "compelling" in theory, no such violation occurred in this context, as the establishment clause was held
not to bar the extension of general civil benefits to religious
groups.8 2 In Widmar, the "general benefit" was access to a "limited
public forum," but the logic of Widmar suggests that the principle of
equal access applies to any "general benefit" that the state offers to
"so broad a spectrum of groups." 8 3
79 408 U.S. at 95-96 (footnote ommitted). See also Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union,
Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949, 1962 (1984) (principle of neutrality as to viewpoints "underlies the
First Amendment itself"); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (following Mosey); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513 (1958) (government may not penalize beliefs by withholding tax exemptions granted to
others); Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 20, 21
(1975) ("[T]he principle of equal liberty lies at the heart of the first amendment's protections against regulation of the content of speech."); id. at 26 ("[T]he principle of equal
liberty of expression is inherent in the first amendment ..
").This principle is especially
applicable to religious speech. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); cf. Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 193, 194
(speaking of "equality principle" as "inherent in the establishment clause").
80 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
81 454 U.S. at 269-70.
82 See 454 U.S. at 274-75 ("The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups
is an important index of secular effect. . . .If the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, 'a church could not be protected by the police
and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair.' ") (citations omitted).
83 Id.; see, e.g., Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986) (discussed in notes 26164 infra and accompanying text). Establishment clause doctrine may, in application, be
meaningfully likened to "public forum" and "government as speaker" doctrines under the
first amendment speech clause. The first amendment protects free speech just as it does
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Given the holding and rationale in Widmar, it would seem but a
short step from the speech clause to the religion clauses. The
Court took an apparent stride in the direction of a full-fledged
equal protection approach in Larson v. Valente,84 decided just a few
months after Widmar. In Larson, the Court struck down a Minnesota
statute that imposed greater administrative burdens on religious
groups that depend heavily on solicitation of funds from nonmembers. In the words of the Court, laws which work discrimination
among religions require "strict scrutiny":
The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that
one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.
[W]hen we are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law
as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its
constitutionality. 8 5
The Larson Court found the constitutional prohibition of de-

nominational preference "inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause,"'8 6 because such an

atmosphere of official denominational preference would frustrate
equality of liberty to exercise and propagate religious beliefs. The
Court explicitly endorsed a Madisonian perspective, 87 noting that
the free exercise of religion "can be guaranteed only when legislators ... are required to accord to their own religions the very same
treatment given to small, new, or unpopular denominations." 88

Thus, in Larson, the Court seemed to recognize equality of free exercise as lying at the core of the establishment clause.

In the four years since Larson, however, the Supreme Court has
free exercise of religion; but, as a corollary, it also places boundaries on government's ability to dominate discussion by way of official speech or by exclusion of dissenting views. In
the case of the establishment clause, it is clear textual prohibition (rather than inference)
which prevents government from engaging in explicit "religious speech" and from excluding dissent, or from sponsoring or accommodating a "religious public forum" that selectively excludes certain religious beliefs or activities. Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355,
1366, 1368 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (comparing message government communicates, for purposes of establishment clause, to message communicated whenever the government acts as speaker). It is precisely toward fashioning analogous constitutional rules
for fair "inclusion" and "exclusion" that the equal protection model developed in this article is directed.
84 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
85 Id. at 244, 246.
86 Id. at 245.
87 Id.
88 Id. The Court also cited Justice Jackson's concurrence in Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) ("[T]he principles of law which officials would
impose upon a minority must be imposed generally."). For a remarkably similar, though
more far-reaching, formulation of this same basic proposition, see Luke 6:31 ("and as you
wish that .men would do to you, do so to them.").
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not again advanced the equal protection analysis begun in that
opinion. Instead, the Court has continued to wrestle with the
three-part Lemon test while voicing repeated dissatisfaction both
with the test and the vagaries of its application. Unmistakably, the
Court is at a point of doctrinal flux in its establishment clause analysis. In Lynch v. Donnelly,8 9 the Court only nominally applied the tripartite Lemon test in upholding the presence of a nativity scene as
part of a municipal Christmas display; the Court emphasized its
"unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area." 90 And in Marsh v. Chambers,9 1 while upholding the
constitutional validity of paid legislative chaplaincies and legislative
92
prayer, the Court failed even to discuss the three-pronged test.
It is not clear whether the decisions in Lynch and Marsh signal
an abandonment of the Lemon doctrine or merely an attempt to
chisel out exceptions.9 3 What is more clear is the need to find a
workable alternative to analysis which the Court itself concedes is
both unclear and ad hoc. 94 The Court's sporadic retreat to the
Lemon test 9 5 probably reflects the intuition that there is something
basically "right" about the analytic tools of each prong-"purpose," "effect," and "entanglement"-of the test. The Court's re89 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
90 Id. at 1362. See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) ("There are always risks in treating criteria discussed by the Court from time to
time as 'tests' in any limiting sense of that term.").
91 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
92 See note 34 supra.
93 Last Term, the Court reverted to a rigid use of the Lemon formula. See, e.g., Wallace
v.Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985);
Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). Nevertheless, at the same time, the opposition of
several Justices to its continued use intensified. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at
2505, 2507 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (Court's treatment of Lemon test "suggests a naive
preoccupation with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional issues ...
[Ojur responsibility is not to apply tidy formulae by rote; our duty is to determine whether
the statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion."); id. at 2508,
2517-20 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting); id. at 2508 (WhiteJ., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 105
S. Ct. at 3242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf.Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2496-97 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("Perhaps because I am new to the struggle, I am not ready to
abandon all aspects of the Lemon test. I do believe, however, that the standards announced
in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in achieving
the underlying purpose of the First Amendment."); Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3243, 3247-48
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing entanglement test).
94 In the Court's own words, the present approach "sacrifices clarity and predictability
for flexibility, but this promises to be the case until the continuing interaction between the
courts and the States... produces a single, more encompassing construction of the Establishment Clause." Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646, 662 (1980). See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (opinion of
Powell, J.) ("Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often must seem arbitrary."); id. at 264-65 (opinion of Stevens,J.) (lines drawn must have "a fundamental character" and must not differentiate between direct and indirect subsidies or between types of
instructional materials).
95 See note 93 supra.
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current drift away from Lemon doubtless reflects the belief that
there is something dreadfully "wrong" with the way that test is
96
presently packaged.
The shortcomings of the Lemon test, as currently constituted,
disguise a valuable core of analysis that can be revamped into a
workable equal protection or "neutrality" approach to establishment clause adjudication. This task involves stripping down each
component of the test to its basic elements, clearing away the conceptual clutter which each prong has collected, and then putting
the test back together again, in a more streamlined and sensible
form.
IV.

Pruning Lemon's Prongs

Any fruitful revision of Lemon should sharpen the focus on
whether a government policy generates inequalities of religious liberty among adherents of different beliefs. 97 An "equal protection of
free exercise" model can be grown from the same seeds as the
Court's defective tripartite test. The core of the equal protection
model is an examination of the differential "effects" of government
classifications on the free exercise of religion in its various forms,
including the freedom of "nonexercise" of religion. Examination
of these effects is heightened when the prima facie "purpose" of a
classification is to have certain effects on religious exercise. "Strict
scrutiny" should apply to such overtly religion-conscious classifications to ensure that they closely fit the compelling state interest in
accommodating free exercise of religion and are not attempts at
religious favoritism. Finally, government policies with effects on
religious freedom must employ the "least-entangling-means" of attaining their objectives. Unnecessary "entanglement" of religion
and government in any program or policy should subject such programs only to somewhat heightened or "intermediate" scrutiny of
their effects on liberties of religious exercise and nonexercise. The
three-part Lemon test thus becomes a modified one-part "effects"
test with "purpose" and "entanglement" playing more realistic and
sensible roles as triggers of varying levels of scrutiny in examination of a law's effects on religious liberty-the real issue in any religion
clause case.
96 Justice O'Connor's recent opinions best represent this straddle. See, e.g., Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2496-97 (1985) (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("not ready to abandon
all aspects of the Lemon test" but test "should be re-examined and refined"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97 See note 83 supra. Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" approach seems to be a "special case" of this proposition, relevant when the challenge is to the symbolic "speech" of
government in matters touching religion. See text accompanying notes 179-85 infra.
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Toward a Refined "Effects" Test

The "effects" prong is properly the heart of the establishment
clause inquiry, reflecting as it does concern for equality of treatment in matters of religious liberty. Presently, legislation must have
a "primary effect" that "neither advances nor inhibits religion." 9 8
The effects test, as currently framed, is the watered-down descendent ofJustice Black's dictum in Everson that "[n]either a state
nor the Federal Government can ... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another." 9 9 The
prohibition of aid to all religions, as observed earlier, 10 0 rested on
an explicitly Jeffersonian perspective of "separation,"'' 0 1 a perspective from which the Court has since retreated in recognition of the
flexibility needed for the state to accommodate religion and pre10 2
serve a genuine neutrality cognizant of religious differences.
The resulting "primary effect" test has focused on the comparative
impact of a given policy on religion as opposed to "nonreligion,"' 0 3
a basis of distinction that has more than its share of problems. Defining what is or is not "religious" is a task for which secular courts
are not particularly well-suited. 10 4 Worse, though, is the Court's
98 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added). As such, the "effects" prong addresses
"free exercise" concerns as much as it does traditional "establishment" issues. See Pfeffer,
supra note 7, at 564; Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1380, 1382

(1981).
99 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
100 See text accompanying notes 39-66 supra.
101 330 U.S. at 16, 18 ("In the words ofJefferson, the clause ... was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between church and State.' ... That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.").
102 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 ("Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state. . . . [T]he line of separation, far from being a 'wall', is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier ....
"). See also text accompanying notes 122-52 infra.
103 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."). Here, the Court introduced the awkward and unfortunate term "nonreligion" in
an attempted shorthand paraphrase ofJustice Black's Everson dictum: "[The First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to
be used to handicap religions than it is favor them." 330 U.S. at 18.
104 Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of CompetingAuthorities,
90 YALE LJ. 350 (1980) (free exercise of religion involves norms external to secular legal
system which are better defined by that external authority; existence of norms conflicting
with secular norms requires a "conflict of laws" type of approach); id. at 360 & nn. 60-61
(judging what is or is not centrally "religious" is "beyond the practical and institutional
competence of courts"). See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. at 715; L. TRIBE, supra note 7,
§ 14-6, at 826-33; Freeman, The Misguided Searchfor the ConstitutionalDefinition of "Religion, "
71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983).
Whether a particular free exercise claim for exemption is based on a "sincerely-held
religious belief" may occasionally necessitate a threshold inquiry into what is "religious" in
order to guard against spurious claims. L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-11, at 859-65. But to
continue to use religious criteria in assessing fine gradations of a classification is to persist
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use of the ungodly term "nonreligion." If defining religion is impractical, defining its opposite (its inverse? its complement?) borders on the absurd. And discerning a law's different impact on each
of these nether-regions involves a court in a positively cosmological
quagmire.
The religion/nonreligion dichotomy of the present "primary
effect" test is the translation into doctrinal terms of the Court's unclear thinking about the establishment clause at the theoretical
level. "Neutrality," like "equality," is a principle of relationship,
not of content. 10 5 A statement such as "the state should be neutral" is completely vacuous; it says nothing about that with respect
to which the state is supposed to be neutral. If permitted to choose
the yardstick of "neutrality," any clever lawyer can with equal ease
state six "neutral" purposes and effects of a government policy or
half a dozen reasons why the law is not neutral and thus "unfair."
The level of abstraction upon which the Supreme Court has
focused is arbitrary as well as abstruse. The text and history of the
first amendment strongly suggest that the Framers would not have
intended to protect "nonreligion" even if they knew what it
meant.' 0 6 Yet, even as nonreligion appears to have been given
either nonprotection or nonconsideration, it does seem clear that
in using a standard that moves beyond a court's area of natural competence when alternative standards may render it unnecessary to do so. Cf. W. ALSTON, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 89-90 (1964) (identifying "religion-making characteristics" is less difficult than
evaluating degrees of their presence or absence).
105 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 367, 372 (1970) (White, J., dissenting)
("neutrality" in establishment clause context is "not self-defining"). See generally Westen,
The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).

Professor Westen argues that all

relationships of equality depend for their substantive content on some rule or principle
with respect to which persons or groups are to be treated equally. The notion that "likes"
are to be treated "alike" (and "unalikes," "unalike") is, for all intents and purposes, tauto-

logical. What is important is the way in which individuals or groups are defined to be alike
(or unalike).
One must know precisely what it means to say for purposes of equality that two

persons are alike.
Equality is an empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own.
Relationships of equality (and inequality) are derivative, secondary relationships;

they are logically posterior, not anterior, to rights. To say that two persons are the
same in a certain respect is to presuppose a rule-a prescribed standard for treating them-that both fully satisfy.
Id. at 544, 547-48 (footnotes omitted).

106 The elimination of a general "freedom of conscience" provision from earlier drafts
of the religion clauses may prove instructive. One of the earlier proposed versions read:
"Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof,
or to infringe the rights of conscience." 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 54, at 766. George
Freeman has found the shift in language a meaningful one, concluding that the possible
interpretations of the change fail to support the view that the Founders sought to protect

freedom of conscience per se. "What the free exercise clause protects is the free exercise of
religion, not the free exercise of conscience." Freeman, supra note 104, at 1522. The
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the Framers intended that the national government have no power
to compel religious exercise, observance, or fidelity in any way. In
short, while "nonreligion" likely would have struck the Framers as
an irrelevant and nonsensical concept, the freedom not to exercise
some or any religion was at the heart of the debate.' 0 7 Similarly, it
is not religion per se which the amendment protects but rather the
free exercise thereof. The text itself thus suggests the appropriate
level of generality: The substantive right with respect to which
government is to be "neutral" is freedom of religious exercise, not "religion" as an abstract concept.' 0 8
This is the character of the "right" which Madison championed
in the Remonstrance, as "equal title to the free exercise of Religion."' 0 9 A misreading of Madison's Remonstrance has led some to
conclude that the object of the establishment clause was to grant a
peculiar right to taxpayers to object to how tax money is spent.
This was clearly a subsidiary and derivative concern of the Framers,
including Madison, and when taken out of context, warps the naSupreme Court itself has recognized this distinction. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-16 (1972).
107 Justice Rehnquist's claim that "the Establishment Clause [does not require] government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion," Wallace v.Jaffree, 105 S.Ct. at
2520 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), must therefore be carefully qualified. Rehnquist's own
explication of history reveals the concern of some Framers that the amendment's phrasing
"be made in such a way as to secure.., free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to
patronize those who professed no religion at all." Id. at 2511 (quoting the remarks of Rep.
Huntington). The point may involve only precision of expression. If "irreligion" means
anti-religious expression, Rehnquist is right. But if Rehnquist means that government need
not be neutral between an individual's choice to exercise religion or not to exercise religion,
his own historical analysis furnishes evidence which refutes the point. See id. at 2511.
108 This approach also does betterjustice to the categories Justice Black used in Everson.
See note 103 supra. Government must not compel a person's attendance or nonattendance at

church, nor can it reward or punish religious belief or disbelief. The religious contrasts are
better classed as subcategories of exercise and nonexercise of religion than of religion and nonreligion. The same point can be made with respect to a religion/irreligion dichotomy. Cf.
Merel, supra note 66, at 812-15 (arguing that the establishment clause mandates neutrality
as betv, een different expressions of belief in relation to religion, i.e., neutrality toward the
content of religious speech). See alsoJafree, 105 S. Ct. at 2496, 2497-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor eschews the term "neutrality," preferring to call her approach to
reconciling the religion clauses one of "accommodation." Id. at 2504-05. Oncefreedom of
religious exercise is acknowledged as the object of government "neutrality," the difference is
more semantic than substantive. Since free exercise may involve different things for different religious beliefs, "neutrality" with respect to free religious exercise may only mean
consistent, predictable, and equitable standards for applying the principle of "accommodation." Following Justice O'Connor's suggestion, the equal protection methodology proposed herein is designed as a way of "identifying workable limits to the Government's
license to promote the free exercise of religion," id. at 2504, based on the premise that the
religion clauses do not require a rigidly secularist "neutrality" but rather "neutrality in the
face of religious differences." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
This analysis is also important to the discussion of the "purpose" test. See text accompanying notes 122-29 infra.
109 See text accompanying note 72-74 supra.
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ture of the "right" protected by the establishment clause as one
sounding in religious liberty and fair treatment. The establishment
clause is a safeguard against compelled or induced exercise of religion by means direct and indirect, one of which might in practice
prove to be through the pocketbook; but the establishment clause is
not a pocketbook right.1 10
The permissible extent of a statute's religious "effects" (i.e.,
the scope of permitted "overinclusiveness" or "underinclusiveness") should therefore be measured not in terms of dollars and
cents, but rather, in terms of effects upon fundamental free exercise
and nonexercise rights. The "primary effect" prong of Lemon, then,
should be revised to read: A law or classification must neither advance
nor inhibit the exercise of any particularreligion as against the exercise of any
other religion, or as against the right not to exercise any religion. This new
110 A close examination of the context in which the familiar "three pence" argument
occurs in Madison's Remonstrance reveals its role in Madison's argument. Madison's first two
arguments concern the nature of the right of religious freedom and the absence of governmental jurisdiction to intrude upon it. In the third paragraph, Madison employs a slipperyslope illustration to support his position that "it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties" and that small taxes to support benign establishments could, in
principle, be transformed into an obligation of conformity to a pernicious establishment.
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect
of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any
one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever?
Remonstrance, supra note 72, at 65-66 (emphasis added).
Compelled conformity in matters of religious exercise was the result to be feared. Being asked to pay "three pence" to support religious education was put forward as a way in
which government might establish a toehold in this area which could then lead to the feared
compulsion; it was not the feared result itself. Importantly, the argument was part of a
political broadside against a contemplated legislative act, not a judicial explication of the
meaning of a textual provision enacted years later and in a different situation.
Moreover, nothing like the modern welfare state with its quasi-"entitlements" to government largesse was even remotely envisioned by Madison. Eighteenth-century Virginians
knew no broad-based government aid programs funded by means of tax revenues and administered by large bureaucracies as quasi-entitlements. It is therefore important to distinguish the radically different roles of government in 1786 and 1986 when the question is what
constitutes abuse of government power "on behalf of" religion. A legislatively mandated
tithe, even "to the church of your choice," is significantly and meaningfully different from
allowing individuals to use "their share," as it were, of the largesse of the welfare state in
the manner of their own choice. See notes 261-64 infra and accompanying text. Given
Madison's powerful arguments for equality of religious liberty in the subsequent
paragraphs of the Remonstrance (to say nothing of his proposed language for the first amendment, see text accompanying note 74 supra), it is difficult to seriously maintain that
Madison's Remonstrance supports the position that religion alone must be excluded systematically from stock financial benefits of the welfare state. The anachronistic reasoning which
has led some to equate Madison's opposition to the Religious Assessment Bill with the
twentieth-century strict "no aid" to religion position, see, e.g., W. MILLER, supra note 46, at
101, simply fails to come to grips with the depths of Madison's fundamental premises.
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effects test asks whether government policy has coercive or discriminatory effects on an individual's religious exercise.
In practical terms, courts should, naturally enough, consider
any asserted religious "benefit" of an enactment against the backdrop of comparable benefits made available generally. "' Similarly,
accretion or dimunition of various benefits provided by the government fisc may affect the constitutionality of other "aids" or "burdens" in terms of overall effect on religious exercise. What is at
stake is the freedom of individuals and groups to make religiously
oriented choices free from the distorting effect of government's co12
ercive hand, one way or the other.
Not only is this a far more appropriate constitutional inquiry,
but it is also more practical for courts to look to outward and visible
signs than to inward and spiritual states. While the difference between a court's competence to discern effects on religious exercise
as opposed to "religion" may be subtle (indeed, effects on religious
exercise may simply be a more precise expression for what is really
meant by "effects on religion"), the difference between a court's
competence to weigh effects on nonexercise as opposed to "nonreligion" is enormous. The question of whether a classification
threatens the freedom not to exercise any religion is answered by
looking for indicia of governmental compulsion of religious exercise-indicia that are far more likely to be concrete, visible, and objective than any contrivance for measuring effects upon
"nonreligion." It is perhaps not coincidental that the inquiry
courts are better able to undertake is also the one which close examination of the amendment's text more reasonably supports.
A "Free Exercise" Aside
The Supreme Court's present free exercise clause doctrine focuses on the "effects" of government policy in a way that is remarkably similar to the above discussion regarding the establishment
clause's "effects" test. Consideration of the effects of religious
"burdens" very nearly mirrors the establishment clause analysis for
"benefits," with one important difference: The imposition of
across-the-board burdens may well have a disproportionate impact
on religious individuals and organizations when a religious belief or
exercise conflicts with the general secular norm. For example, a
state policy that strongly induces persons to work on Saturday in a
very real sense places a greater burden on the religious liberty of a
111 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397-98; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75; Walz, 397 U.S. at 673; see
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609-10 & n.3 (opinion of Powell, J.)
(noting the wide diversity in § 501 (c)(3) exempt organizations). See also text accompanying
notes 230-60 infra.
112 Cf. Garvey, supra note 79.
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Seventh Day Adventist than on the person who simply would prefer
to watch college football on TV than go to work." 13 Accordingly, as
the Court has repeatedly held, the free exercise clause may occasionally require that religious organizations or individuals be accorded an exemption from rules of general applicability to the
extent that such exemption does not interfere with the free exercise
or nonexercise rights of others.' 14
A not undebatable premise here is that the first amendment
protects the free exercise of religion in a way that it does not guarantee a constitutional right to watch college football." t5 This distinction cannot be nullified by an assertion (typically based on the
establishment clause) that the fan is indirectly being forced to "support" the religion of the Adventist. The first amendment enshrines
the willingness of American society to spread the costs, as it were,
of religious toleration and accommodation. A nonbeliever's objection arises only when those costs actually abridge or injuriously discriminate against his freedom of nonexercise. The believer who
does not require an exemption is in essentially the same situation;
he has no objection unless the effect of the cost-spreading is to impair or meaningfully discriminate against his free exercise of religion. Thus, neither the atheist nor the Methodist finds his religious
freedom curtailed by working on Saturday while the Adventist is
accorded an exemption to recognize her Sabbath. Outside of limiting cases approaching a two-person world, where exemption of
a believer from a burden always and inevitably places a commensurate burden on the nonbeliever, the nonbeliever's liberty-his freedom from the coerced exercise of any religion-is not
6
endangered."
113 Or, for that matter, on the person with strong "secular" reasons for not working on
Saturday. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401-02 n.4 (1963).
114 See text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
115 Indeed, only a denial of this basic premise can explain the Court's bizarre holding
last Term in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985), striking down a
Connecticut law requiring employers to give employees their sabbath day off. (All workers
were entitled to one day off a week; workers observing a sabbath could choose that day. The
law replaced Connecticut's longstanding Sunday closing laws, such as had been upheld by
the Court in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).) It would be unwise to read too
much into Caldor-the Court's decision is as incomprehensible as its opinion is slight-but
the Court did note that weekend days (most sabbaths) are widely prized days off and that
employees with "strong and legitimate, but non-religious reasons for wanting a weekend
day off" were not given the same "rights" under the Connecticut statute. 105 S. Ct. at 2918
n.9.
The proposition that courts can read the establishment clause to require that religion
never be treated differently from other considerations would, in principle and effect, have
the establishment clause repeal (or at least gut) the free exercise clause which immediately
follows it. Cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 367, 372 (1970) (White,J., dissenting)
("It cannot be ignored that the First Amendment itself contains a religious classification.").
116 Here, as in most cases, the freedom of "nonexercise" is but a special case of free
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The case for permissible accomodation is strongest in a large
pluralistic society in which burdens (such as taxation) are widely
dispersed. 1 7 Whether a classification is violative of the religion
clauses may, thus, depend very heavily on the presence or absence
of "cost-spreading" (or, conversely, "benefit-dispersion") of religious effects.118 The point is that first amendment rights are held
against the state, not against other individuals, and that too small a
sample can transform the first amendment's cost-sharing among society into cost-shifting between individuals. 119 General benefits in
which all potentially can share pose few establishment clause
problems,120 but classifications which have a disproportionate impact on particular religious beliefs should have their free exercise
"costs" measured by the effect of an exemption from the general
2
rule, not against the rule itself.' '
exercise, a right which is rarely (if ever) violated by the accommodation of another's free
exercise. Jafree, 105 S. Ct. at 2496, 2497-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117 This proposition may be simply the twentieth-century "welfare state" version of
Madison's thesis that an extended republic is the best guarantor of individual liberty because of its tendency to disperse factions and avoid concentrations of perpetual political
winners and losers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 53-62 (1. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1941).
118 The difficult case is draft exemptions. Like tax exemptions or other financial "benefits," the "cost" of accommodation is spread widely among a large group. The pool of
potential draftees, however, is significantly smaller than that of taxpayers. Also, unlike the
taxpayer cases, the stakes are much higher; they not only involve compulsory service for a
period of years, but also the risk of loss of life. The Catholic whose "just war" belief leads
him to conscientiously object only to some wars, or the secular humanist who holds a
roughly analogous viewpoint, must serve while the absolute religious pacifist does not. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). In a sense, the burden is dispersed and risks
collectively shared, but in an equally persuasive sense, the Catholic and the secular humanist are palpably injured due to their nonadherence to the creed of the complete pacifist.
In a yet more remote sense, non-objectors are also burdened. This latter kind of"discrimination" is probably not enough to justify a ban on all conscientious objection, expecially given the important free exercise problems which that would create. Any purely
religion-based conscientious objection classification, however, should have its effects subjected to strict scrutiny. See text accompanying notes 122-52 infra. The Supreme Court's
uneasiness with precisely such a congressional scheme is doubtless what led to the Court's
commendable, albeit incomplete, "grafts" onto the statute. Compare IWelsh, 398 U.S. 333,
and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) with Gillette, 401 U.S. 437.
119 See Caldor, 105 S. Ct. at 2918-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977) (dictum) ("TWA would have had to deprive another employee of his shift preference at least in part because he did not adhere to a religion that observed the Saturday Sabbath."). For an illustration of this principle in a
different legal context, see Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576
(1984).
120 See note 82 supra.
121 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (emphasis added):
Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, we cannot
accept ... a sweeping claim [of compelling state interests]; despite its admitted
validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that
the State seeks to promote by its requirement . . . and the inpedimtent to those objectives that would flow flow recognizing the claimed.., exemption.
On first blush, the asymmetry between the use of a general backdrop for evaluating
"benefits" and a specific case-focus for examining certain "burdens" appears to load the
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The Purpose of "Purpose" Religion as a Suspect Classification

The first prong of the Lemon test requires that a law have a
"secular legislative purpose." Time and application have skewed
the test so as to ask whether the statute has as a major purpose the
"advancement or inhibition of religion." Put this way, the "purpose" test duplicates much of the "effects" inquiry and begs the
critical question: Whether the "advancement of religion" (to accede, momentarily, to the use of a loaded phrase) might ever constitute a valid secular legislative purpose. Courts have wrongly taken
the phrase "secular legislative purpose" to imply that it is improper
for a state to be motivated by the desire to accommodate religious
exercise. 122 Yet, "the Constitution," as the Court in Lynch declared,
"affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of
all religions, and forbids hostility toward any." 123 The Court's decisions in Sherbert v. Verner, 124 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 125 and Thomas v. Redice. In fact, however, it is a natural corollary to a view of the religion clauses which focuses
on individual rights. Tribe's two-tiered definition of religion is an awkward and unnecessary
contrivance for effectuating this premise. See note 66 supra. Rather than create a broad
definition of religion for free exercise purposes and a narrow one for establishment purposes, one need only focus on the religious "burdens" on the individual in free exercise
cases and on the scheme of "benefits" as a whole in establishment cases, to see if the government policy at issue abridgessome individual'sreligious liberty. See also note 163 infra (arguing that only individuals who allege an actual infringement of their religious liberty should
have standing to bring an establishment or free exercise clause challenge).
122 The opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court in Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191
Conn. 336, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), af'd, 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985), provides a telling illustration. There the highest court of Connecticut found that the statute in question failed the
purpose prong because "[t]he unmistakable purpose of such a provision is to allow those
persons who wish to worship on a particular day the freedom to do so." 191 Conn. at 349,
464 A.2d at 793. Such a reading of the "purpose" test is nothing short of ludicrous. The
Connecticut Supreme Court in effect held that to "allow" persons the "freedom to worship"
is an unconstitutional motivation, a truly remarkable interpretation of the same amendment
which forbids impairment of the free exercise of religion. Although the United States
Supreme Court's Caldor opinion is opaque, it does not appear to affirm this rationale. See
note 115 supra.
On other occasions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the propriety of legislation
having the purpose of either accommodating religious exercise or, on the other side of the
coin, preventing an "establishment." See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756, 773-74, 788 (1973) (statute found to have a proper "secular legislative purpose" even though one of the specifically argued and recognized purposes
of the statute was "to promote the free exercise of religion"); loder, 406 U.S. at 222 n.l 1
(dictum) (Congress properly could create the power to exempt members of "a recognized
religious sect" from participation in social security system under 26 U.S.C. § 1402(h), even
though such a classification "was enacted with the situation of the Old Order Amish specifically in view."); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (interest of State University in
maintaining separation of church and state "may be characterized as compelling"); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978) (accepting, arguendo, the presence of a "compelling
and overbalancing state interest" in preventing an establishment of religion).
123 Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359 (citations omitted).
124 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
125 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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view Board, 126 which carve out explicit religious exceptions from the
purview of facially neutral statutes for the purpose of advancing the
free exercise rights of the individuals or groups involved, would
seem to run afoul of the way the "purpose" prong (or, for that matter, the "effects" prong) is currently formulated. It is hard to deny
Justice Rehnquist's sardonic observation that the decisions in Sherbert and Thomas compelled states to take action under the free exercise clause which they would be prohibited from taking voluntarily
1 27
according to the Court's establishment clause tests.
The Supreme Court has three choices: (1) It may retreat from
its vigorous protection of individual free exercise rights; (2) It may
continue the course of contradiction and confusion; or (3) It may
modify its "purpose" (as well as its "effects") analysis to reflect the
legitimacy of policies motivated by the desire to accommodate free
exercise needs. The fear, of course, is that the stated need to accommodate religion could be misused to 'justify" wanton favoritism or discriminatory promotion of a particular sect or religion
generally, resulting in a violation of the religious liberty of those
not so "accommodated."' ' 28 Similarly, the state might propose, in
the guise of the establishment clause, that a benefit be made available to all except those who might use it for a religious end.129 Examination of a law's "purpose" is useful to the extent that it sheds
light on the permissible scope of a statute's intended effects. The
point is that a religious "purpose" may not always be improper, but
it always calls for a more probing examination than when such a
purpose is absent.
Stated in equal protection jargon, the purpose test operates
126 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
127 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 726 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 414 (StewartJ., concurring) (Court's decision creates "many situations
where legitimate claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision with
the Court's insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment Clause.").
128 See note 108 supra. See also text accompanying notes 141-51 bifra (discussing Wallace
v.Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985)).
129 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618
(1978). The Supreme Court heard arguments this Term in two cases in which the state
sought to use the establishment clause as a justification for discrimination against religious
groups or individuals simply on the basis of the content of their speech as religious or because of a beneficiary's intended religious vocation. See Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986), and Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the
Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986), respectively.
In lliters, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment of the Washington
Supreme Court which had held that it would violate the federal establishment clause for a
state to finance an individual's training at a Christian college. See notes 261-64 hfra and
accompanying text.
In Bender, the Supreme Court dodged the first amendment issue by deciding that the
respondent lacked standing to appeal. Thus, the case was remanded with directions to
dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See notes 265-69 i'fra and accompanying text.
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best as a trigger of "strict scrutiny." A policy that on its face intends to have specific effects on religion calls attention to itself as a
policy affecting a fundamental right and employing a classification
that is, in terms of first amendment freedoms of religious exercise
and nonexercise, highly suspicious. Presumptively, at least, classifications along religious lines have effects upon the exercise of religious liberty. This appears to have been the fundamental premise
behind the establishment clause insofar as it was designed to protect religious liberty. An official church, for example, is conclusively presumed to impair an individual's freedom to worship as he
or she chooses. 130 It follows from this presumption that religion is
a "suspect classification." Statutes explicitly and exclusively classifying in religious terms should be subjected to "strict scrutiny," the
effects of such policies being required to closely fit a compelling
31
state interest.
Another way of looking at "purpose" analysis is as a shortcut
method of proof of a law's effects. Frequently, proof of such "effects" by objective means is difficult, and it may therefore make a
great deal of difference who bears the burden of proof and persuasion. If it is fair to at least presume that a law has its intended effects
(an admittedly heroic assumption of basic legislative competence is
required here), the purpose inquiry can function sensibly as a burden-shifting device, much as various other "presumptions" are employed in law. The defender of a law that employs plainly religious
classifications should be obligated to show how the classification
does not abridge religious liberty. As a practical matter, then, to
survive "strict scrutiny" is to meet the fairly heavy evidentiary requirements necessary to rebut the presumption that religious classifications impair religious freedom.
One cluster of situations surviving such strict scrutiny would be
religion-based exceptions from laws of general applicability on free
exercise grounds, as discussed above. 132 The state interest in pro130 It is this presumption, I believe, which lies at the heart of the establishment clause, as
a protection of religiousfreedom. Cf Jafree, 105 S. Ct. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (government "endorsement" of a particular religious practice "infringes the religious liberty of
the non-adherent" through indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform). As an empirical matter, such a presumption is doubtless overbroad. Statutes classifying along religious lines often may have virtually no discernible effect on the actual
exercise or nonexercise of religion. Surprisingly enough, this might even be said of an
officially established, but completely liberal and tolerant, national religion. The establishment clause's text itself, however, commands the presumption that such arrangements have
deleterious effects on religious freedom, even when they are extremely subtle. Treating
religion as a "suspect classification" simply reflects the presumption of the Framers that
religious classifications have pernicious effects on religious liberty.
131 For an explantion of the strict srutiny/compelling state interest test, seeJ. NowAK, R.
ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 590-99 (2d ed. 1983).
132 See text accompanying notes 113-21 supra. See also notes 118-19 supra.
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tecting the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion is certainly compelling. Accordingly, it might be perfectly proper to
intend to "benefit" a particular religious belief by removing an impediment to its free exercise. Nonetheless, religious accommodation which employs explicitly religious categories must have a close
fit of classification to burden sought to be removed, so as not to
133
amount in practice to religious favoritism.
It should therefore go without saying that the state must be
evenhanded in its attempts to accommodate religion. In situations
where accommodation of religion is constitutionally required, decisionmakers (courts as well as legislatures and executives) must apply free exercise exemption principles consistently. Similarly, where
religious accommodation is permissible but not required, the terms
of such accommodation must not generate major discrepancies in
effect upon various religions or exercises of religion. In short, both
essential and nonessential accommodation of religion must be provided "fairly." "Fairness" is policed in either case by subjecting to
heightened scrutiny laws which use clearly religious classifications,
to ensure that the purported accommodation is truly enabling
rather than prescriptive, and actually accommodates and not
induces.
Though government indeed "follows the best of our traditions" when it seeks to accommodate the religious beliefs of its people,13 4 the boundaries of such accommodation extend no further
than the genuine need for such accommodation. That the declaration of an official state religion would be a wantonly overbroad and
unjustifiable "accommodation" is obvious. Symbolic uses of religion pose much closer and tougher cases, but still encounter constitutional difficulties since there is rarely asserted a state interest
sufficiently compelling to justify even "minor" intrusions on free
exercise and nonexercise rights.
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that certain ceremonial
or traditional invocations of religion by the state may be so embedded in the community's consciousness as to negate their "suspect"
character 35 (though not their religious character' 3 6 ). Such cases
133 Courts would, for example, look with equally antagonistic eyes at a statute purporting to accommodate the free exercise rights only of Presbyterians and at a law designed
only to accommodate the Amish. The former might survive if narrowly tailored to a peculiar
need. The latter could (and likely would) pass muster if closely tailored to the peculiar
situation of the Amish and their need for modifications in the ordinary regulatory scheme
of government. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222-23 n. 11. The propriety of laws adjusted to the
peculiar situation of religious groups does not depend on any notion of special solicitude
for religious minorities. See note 152 infra (comparing free exercise accommodation with
affirmative action).
134 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
135 Id. at 313-15 (collecting examples). See also text accompanying notes 137-47 infra.

1986]

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

may not call for heightened scrutiny, but only for ordinary review of
the enactment's actual elects (depending upon the history, nature,
and context of the state's use of religion). For example, in Marsh v.
Chambers,'3 7 the Court upheld the practice of legislative prayer, led
by paid chaplains, as one with historical roots in the same First
Congress which the previous day had voted passage of the religion
clauses. In Lynch v. Donnelly,'38 the Court found that the context in
which a nativity scene appeared-as part of a town's traditional
Christmas display along with a plastic Santa Claus, reindeer, elves,
a Christmas tree, a teddy bear, and a clown-was not such as to
render the display as a whole "religious" or to connote government
sponsorship of Christianity. 139 The Court said that to "[f]ocus exclusively on the religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause."' 140
In other cases, however, state use of religion will retain its
"suspect" character and fail to stand up under strict scrutiny. Wallace v. Jaffree,14 ' decided just last Term, must be viewed as such a
case. In Jaffree, the Court struck down one of Alabama's two moment-of-silence statutes 142 as having been phrased and designed as
a state "endorsement" of prayer.' 43 Chief Justice Burger's careful
dissent got the better of the legal argument, 44 and Justice Rehn136 The greatest failing of Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984), is that the Court
seemed to denigrate a religious symbol in order to save it. The Court's opinion often
sounds like it is saying that a creche is not a religious symbol ("anymore") rather than
saying that the town's use of a religious symbol of this nature, in this context, was not suspicious nor did it discriminate in any real way against anyone's free exercise or nonexercise of
religion.
137 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
138 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984).
139 See id. at 1366-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (creche did not communicate a state
message of endorsement or disapproval); Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution, 636 F.2d 738,
739-40 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (The court refused to strike down a museum display depicting
"The Emergence of Man" as establishing secular humanist beliefs.) ("1T]he appellants' free
exercise of their religion is not actionably impaired merely because, should they visit the
Smithsonian, they may be confronted with exhibits which are distasteful to their religion.").
See also note 136 supra.
140 104 S.Ct. at 1362. The display in its entirety was not a religious one, much as the
property tax exemption challenged in Walz was not exclusively religious. Conversely, a
statute that classifies exclusively in religious terms-where religion is literally singled out as a
basis for special burdens or benefits-is inherently more suspect than one that uses religion
along with other, alternative categories as a means of affording a common benefit to a
broader group which includes religious beneficiaries. See note 82 supra. See also text accompanying notes 261-64 infra.
141 105 S.Ct. 2479 (1985).
142 The parties conceded that the original 1978 statute is constitutional. Id. at 2481 n. 1.
Apparently, even afterJaffree, this moment-of-silence law is in effect in Alabama.
143 Id. at 2492.
144 Burger noted the flimsiness of the evidence upon which the majority relied in finding
an unconstitutional legislative motivation, including post-enactment statements of the subjective motives of a single legislator. Id. at 2506 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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quist's, the better of the historical, 145 but there is a certain logic to
the majority opinion which is at least understandable if not fully
persuasive. The Court made clear that most moment-of-silence
laws are constitutional. The majority viewed Alabama's enactment
with considerably less deference because of statements by the law's
sponsors and implementers, companion statutes "overruling" the
Court's school prayer decisions, and a general pattern of abuse and
defiance of established case law by state officials. 146 The Jafree
Court scrutinized rather severely a classification employing religious terms which the Court might not otherwise have thought
"suspect." Though one can criticize the Court's use of legislative
history, Jaffree may stand for nothing more extraordinary than that
"bad faith makes bad law." If so qualified,Jaffree is a good working
14 7
example of a religious classification that is acutely suspect.
The real problem withJafree is in the continued use of "purpose" as an independent test of constitutionality. Under the present
Lemon packaging, improper purpose or improper effect invalidates a
policy.1 48 Curiously, under current equal protection doctrine, im49
proper purpose and improper effect invalidates a classification.1
Not only is the discrepancy between the two uses of motivation
analysis indefensible, but neither one seems quite right. At most,
"purpose" and "effect" are but the subjective and objective components of the same inquiry 50 and it is inappropriate to pry them
apart into distinct "prongs" as separate levels of constitutional inquiry. 5 1 More to the point, "wrong" motivation or purpose should
be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for finding a classification unconstitutional, but rather a highly relevant fact to be considered in evaluating (or, as noted above, "presuming") a
classification's religious (or racial) effects.
There is reason to look with more suspicious eyes at any classification that actually intends to have a differential impact that falls
145 Id. at 2508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cf. text accompanying notes 35-58 supra.
146 Id. at 2483-84.
147 See 105 S. Ct. at 2490 ("For even though a statute that is motivated in part by a
religious purpose may satisfy the [purpose prong] ... the First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion.")
(citation omitted).
148 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
149 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
150 See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (speaking of purpose and
effect as "the subjective and the objective components of the message communicated by a
government action").
151 The tests are more independent in theory than in practice. Merel, supra note 66, at
826 (noting that the Supreme Court has been unable to keep the "secular purpose" and
"primary effects" tests distinct) ("The facts on which it has relied to determine primary
effects are often indistinguishable from the kind of information it might use to evaluate
legislative purpose.").
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along religious (or racial) lines, but those eyes should not be blind
to the law's actual effects. By the same token, these effects in many
circumstances may appear unconstitutional even to unsuspicious
eyes. The presence of an allegedly improper purpose should therefore serve to intensify the inquiry but not necessarily to invalidate
the classification. Similarly, the absence of a clearly improper intent
should not forestall the inquiry into a statute's effects; it merely renders disparate effects less presumptively suspicious.152
C. Minimizing InstitutionalEntanglement: A "Least-EntanglingMeans" Requirement
The Supreme Court has given the "entanglement" prong two
different kinds of content, reflecting different underlying conceptions of the establishment clause. 153 Originally, the Court defined
152 Thus, while the decision in Davis, was correct, the rule announced to justify that
decision was needlessly broad. All that the Court needed to say was that, given no intent to
discriminate, the disparate impact of the classification was not, on the facts of the case, so
suspicious, unreasonable, or arbitrary as to warrant its invalidation., See text accompanying
notes 130-36 supra.
An interesting comparison can be made between the propriety of a desire to affirmatively accommodate religious beliefs or practices'and the propriety of motives underlying
racial affirmative action programs. In Regents -of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), for example, the Court approved the use of race as one criterion in a medical school
admissions decision, while disapproving the use of racial entitlement or quota systems.
The use of racial criteria as a means of combatting the historical effects of racial bias required the state to walk a very fine line.,,Attempts to remove burdens on the free exercise of
religion necessarily involve the same sort of precarious balancing. Much like race-conscious remedies, the use of explicitly religious classifications to remove purported free exercise burdens is a sensitive and exacting endeavor.
In utilizing either religion-conscious remedies or race-conscious remedies, a legislature
uses a suspicious basis of classification to attain what may well be permissible objectives. It
is always preferable to attempt to obtain these objectives with classifications that do not use
explicitly racial or religious criteria, i.e., that do not carve out an area of exclusive entitlement
to religion qua religion or to race qua race. It is not thepurpose of either affirmative action or
religious accommodation that is suspicious so much as the inherently suspect criteria that
are often used to fulfill these objectives.
Racial quotas are woefully imprecise tools for furthering the permissible state goals of
remedying racial discrimination. See Scalia, The DiseaseAs Cure, 1979 WAsH. U.L.Q. 147. As
Bakke illustrates, race nonetheless may be taken into consideration, though it ought to be
subjected to strict scrutiny for tightness of fit to legitimate objectives. 438 U.S. at 362 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Similarly, religion is a suspect criterion for bestowing direct benefits.
Nonetheless, it may be utilized so long as the classification closely fits the constitutionally
permissible goal of accommodating the special needs or unique status of religion. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-15. In either the race or religion context, though, use of the suspicious classification must be justified by a clear showing that it is either truly remedial or
purely enabling, and not a means of implementing discrimination or favoritism in disguise.
153 Commentators have almost uniformly found the "entanglement" prong imprecise,
circular, or both. Kurland, supra note 37, at 19 (entanglement test "either empty or nonsensical"); Gianella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement,
1971 Sup. CT. REv. 147, 154 (excessive entanglement or undue involvement begs the question; entanglement is simply "another way of referring to the appropriate degree of separation of church and state"). Some members of the Court have also criticized the
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entanglement as a "comprehensive, discriminating and continuing
state surveillance" of religious organizations incident to implementation of governmental policies. 154 In this sense, the "entanglement" inquiry seeks to prevent government involvement from
sliding down a slippery slope into undue governmental influence
over a religious institution's beliefs, policies, or actions by virtue of
the regulatory strings attached to powerful financial benefits. This
view of the entanglement prong, as a prophylactic protection of
free exercise values,155 comports with the view of both Madison and
Williams that "separation" is designed primarily to protect religion
from interference by the state.
On the other hand, the influence of the Jeffersonian position
appears in opinions casting the entanglement prong as a test for
the "political divisiveness" along religious lines likely to be engendered by a particular policy.15 6 Used in this sense, the entangle-

ment test comes perilously close to suggesting that religious groups
and individuals are not entitled to the same civil and political rights
as others, 57 a position which the Court clearly has rejected. 158
Such a view confuses the Framers' objectives (which doubtless included a desire to minimize political strife along sectarian lines)
with the more limited means they felt could be used to achieve
those objectives. The establishment clause limits government, not
religion. The clause makes explicit limitations on government
power to act. It does not grant government an affirmative power to
expunge the potentially explosive presence of religious views from
public and political life.
The historical formation of the establishment clause suggests a
deliberate refusal to enjoin even the most religiously divisive pracentanglement prong. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976)
(White, J., concurring) (finding test "insolubly paradoxical," "redundant," and "superfluous"); Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1367 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
155 403 U.S. at 625 ("entanglement between government and religion serves as a warning signal").
156 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3240-41 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring);
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
252-55 (1982) (dictum) (discussing "risk of politicizing religion") (quoting Watz, 397 U.S.
at 695); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795-98 ("[O]ne factor of recurring significance in this weighing
process is the potentially divisive political effect of an aid program."); Walz, 397 U.S. at 695
(opinion of Harlan, J.). Once again, this view seems to have its modern origins in the
sweeping language of Everson: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa."
Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
157 Gaffney, PoliticalDivisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglementof the Court in Sloppy
History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.LJ. 205, 212 (1980) (divisiveness test, if taken

seriously, poses serious danger to important civil liberties); Ripple, The Entanglement Test of
the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1225-30 (1980) (same).
158 See note 65 supra.
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tices of the States-religious establishments-precisely because
that would place the national government on one side of a religious
debate. By seeking to ban the national government not only from
establishing an official religion but also from making any law respecting religious establishments, the language agreed upon made
clear that the national government also lacked power to disestablish
official state churches.1 59 The federal government was to involve
itself in neither side of the establishment/disestablishment debate, a
debate whose intensity and divisiveness along religious lines dwarfs
today's arguments over tax exemptions and laws accommodating
religion.
Moreover, "divisiveness" is a double-edged legal sword. The
invalidation of a "divisive" policy because of its supposed "divisiveness" can be the most "divisive" action of all.1 60 Worse, the "divisiveness" concept is inherently unprincipled. There is no
principled basis for deciding in favor of one side rather than the
other in a religiously-divisive dispute simply because of the issue's
divisiveness. To strike down laws based on their "divisiveness"
merely reverses the determination of elected officials as to which
way they should resolve a difficult, divisive policy issue. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has never held "divisiveness" alone sufficient to invalidate a particular policy. The Justices seem largely in
agreement that this factor should not carry any significant
1
weight. 6
The original use of "entanglement" as a test for excessive government intrusion in the operation of religious institutions has
some force, but certainly not as an independent basis for the complete
invalidation of a statute. There is no apparent reason why "entanglement" by itself should invalidate a statute or policy where there
has been no showing of adverse effects on the religious freedom of
any individual or group. What makes entanglement a factor at all is
not its existence per se but its tendency to exacerbate a government
program's effects on religious liberty. It is not surprising, then, that
the entanglement test has almost always been used in conjunction
159 See text accompanying notes 35-58 supra.
160 Some of the most religiously-divisive events and issues of American history have
been spurred or exacerbated by judicial decisions. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
161 See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364-65; id. at 1367 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("political
divisiveness along religious lines should not be an independent test of constitutionality");
id. at 1374-75 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Powell appears alone in continuing to
find "divisiveness" dispositive. See Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3240-41 (Powell,J., concurring). At
present, however, Powell is the key vote on establishment clause questions, having been in
the majority on every closely divided resolution of an establishment clause case in recent
years.
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with perceived shortcomings in one or both of the other Lemon

prongs. 162
Crucially, the central attack on an assertedly unconstitutional
program must remain focused upon that program's effects on religious liberty. For example, itmakes no sense whatsoever to allow a
taxpayer standing to bring an establishment clause challenge solely
on entanglement grounds. If the problem with entangling regulations is that they dig too deeply into the workings of religiously
associated organizations and encourage them to compromise their
autonomy for state aid, then only the burdened institution should
have standing to object to a government policy on entanglement
grounds. As one commentator has observed, "[a]n atheist plaintiff
asserting a church's right to be left alone at the cost of losing aid is
63
the best possible illustration of why there are standing rules."'
The Supreme Court should streamline the entanglement
162 The exceptions, oddly enough, are Lemon itself and Aguilar v. Felton. The Lemon
Court reversed the order in which the establishment clause tests are normally considered
and found the "cumulative impact of the entire relationship" arising under state laws providing salary supplements to teachers in private and parochial schools to pose too great an
entanglement between church and state. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. The Court, thus, did not
"reach" the effects test. Id. at 613-14. The Court's disposition of the case necessarily assumed a conclusion of improper religious effects. The monitoring and supervision provisions of the statutes-designed by the state legislatures to separate religious from secular
functions, and thereby, to avoid or reduce improper religious effects-constituted the forbidden entanglement, in the judgment of the Court. The Court did not, however, merely
strike down the monitoring and supervision requirements and save the rest of the statute.
The judgment clearly implies that the state law, even shorn of its "entangling" provisions,
had a "primary effect" of advancing religion, a finding that is made clear nowhere in the
opinion.
The use of "entanglement" alone to invalidate an Act of Congress last Term in Felton
was essentially unprecedented. Felton is criticized in the text accompanying notes 217-29
infra.
163 Laycock, supra note 98, at 1383. Cf. Abington, 374 U.S. at 266 n.30 (Brennan, J.,
concurring):
If. . . the gravamen of the lawsuit were exclusively one of establishment, it might
seem illogical to confer standing upon a parent who-though he is concededly in
the best position to assert a free-exercise claim-suffers no financial injury, by reason of being a parent, different from that of the ordinary taxpayer, whose standing
may be open to question.
Indeed, the whole notion that the Constitution permits taxpayer standing in establishment clause cases is premised on a strange conception of the establishment clause "right"
as somehow having more to do with the expenditure of government funds than with religious liberty. Consistent with the thesis of this article, the requisite individual "stake" necessary to assert an establishment clause claim should instead consist of an alleged
infringement of free exercise or nonexercise rights. Accordingly, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968) (federal taxpayer held to have standing to bring establishment clause challenge),
was wrongly decided and unnecessarily distinguished in Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (respondents, either in their capacity as taxpayers or as citizens, did not have standing under the
property clause to bring an establishment clause challenge). Cf. Doremus v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (state taxpayer did not have standing to bring an establishment
clause challenge to a state Bible-reading statute).
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prong so that it focuses on the concerns to which it is properly applicable; namely, minimization of government involvement within
any program that strives for genuine "neutrality" in its effects on
religious exercise and nonexercise. 164 Like the "purpose" prong,
the "entanglement" test functions best as a trigger of heightened
scrutiny. In the language of equal protection, entangling relationships are "quasi-suspect."' 16 5 While some such relationships might
be designed to promote genuine neutrality,1 66 others might undermine that goal. As a factor for courts to consider in any challenge
to the effects of a given relationship, entanglement takes on the
character of a side-constraint-an additional parameter within
1 67
which the "effects" calculus takes place.
Whether or not such an approach is given the technical label
"intermediate scrutiny" is of little consequence. 68 What is important is that entanglement of state and religion be subjected to the
same kind of "exacting judicial review"'169 or "heightened judicial
164 This formulation would also avoid the "Catch-22" nature of the entanglement test
when used in tandem with the effects test. Under present law, certain programs providing
financial benefits to religious organizations are, absent careful restrictions on their use,
void. At the same time, those very restrictions will render the statute void on entanglement
grounds. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370 (1975) ("The prophylactic contacts
required to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role... necessarily give rise
to a constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state."). See
also text accompanying notes 207-13 infra.
165 See note 77 supra.
166 The Court has noted that some contacts between church and state are inevitableindeed necessary-in modern society if government is to remain neutral, not hostile, toward religion. See, e.g., Lynch, 104 S.Ct. at 1359.
167 Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 3243, 3248 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Pervasive institutional involvement of church and state may remain relevant in deciding
the effect of a statute which is alleged to violate the Establishment Clause ...but state efforts
to ensure that public resources are used only for nonsectarian ends should not in themselves serve to invalidate an otherwise valid statute.") (emphasis in original).
168 The use of technical talismans based on shifting doctrines is precisely what this article argues against. The term "intermediate scrutiny" is, however, a useful analog, to the
following extent:
(1) Reality compels the recognition that, just as the degree of entanglement lies along
a continuum of real-life situations, so intermediate scrutiny is less a discrete point than a
self-conscious deliberative approach to quasi-suspect classifications. See Note, Quasi-Suspect
Classes and Proofof Discriminatoy, Intent. A New Model, 90 YALE LJ. 912, 916 n.19 (1981); cf.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-22 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
(2) While the present entanglement test invites complete invalidation of a classification
on the basis of a largely arbitrary this-is-too-much-but-this-isn't exercise, intermediate scrutiny mandates only a closer look at the classification's effects. It is more appropriate that a
discretionary judgment as to the "excessiveness" of any entanglement inform the judicial
posture to be assumed than that it dictate the result to be reached. Such an approach
corrects for the disproportionate weight which present analysis gives the entanglement inquiry. It also should counteract the incentive for judges to take advantage of the concept's
relative manipulability to produce result-oriented opinions.
169 Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
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sensitivity" 170 that has characterized review of laws "regulating"
other first amendment rights. "Excessive entanglement" is a natural first-cousin of "least-restrictive-means" analysis in scrutiny of
time, place, and manner restrictions on free speech. 171 Government
regulations may incidentally constrain the autonomy of speakers or
believers, but only when an important reason exists for the constraint, and even then, only by the means of attaining its objective
that is least intrusive on first amendment freedoms; 72 that is, it
must employ the least "entangling" means. This makes complete
sense if one asks what it means for a particular "entanglement" to
be excessive. Simply put, "excessive entanglement" means that the
institutions of church and state are more entangled than they need
to be in order for government to accomplish its otherwise legitimate purposes in the program or policy at issue.
V. Deciding Cases Under the Equal Protection Model
The equal protection model presented above is predicated on
the assumption that the establishment and free exercise clauses can
be thought of as two different ways to approach the same legal
problem. Although outlined in terms of traditional establishment
clause tests, it should come as no surprise that this approach also
functions as a free exercise clause test: The crucial inquiry again
concerns the effects of a given policy upon the free exercise of religion. Adverse effects are more difficult to justify when, by nature of
the classification, they appear intentional ("strict scrutiny" of purpose applies) or involve a continuous, intrusive regulation of
church by state where less-entangling-means of achieving the state
objective are available ("intermediate scrutiny" of entanglement
applies). The Court's current free exercise test is almost exactly
identical to this formula: A limitation on religious liberty may be
justified only by a compelling state interest achieved by the least
173
restrictive means.
294 (1981) ("regulation of First Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial
review").
170 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 n.7 (1981).
171 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
172 See Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. 290; Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63
(1976) (plurality opinion); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973). Compare Zorach, 343
U.S. 306 (upholding released-time program for religious instruction) with McCollum, 333
U.S. 203 (invalidating on-premises religious instruction). The requirement that the state
regulation be "closely" related to an "important" state interest is essentially identical to
that which is necessary for a classification to survive "intermediate scrutiny." See generally
G. GUN-rHER, supra note 77, at 670-75; Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
173 The prevalent doctrine is stated succinctly in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
257-58 (1982): "Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional .... The state may jus-
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Properly conceived, each test is merely the flipside of the
other. That courts can approach a particular religion clause case
from either direction and reach the same result' 74 (an absolute must
for any internally coherent view of the religion clauses) is illustrated
by the cases discussed below, which involve "symbolic accommodation" of religion, and-the more substantive concern-"financial
tify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."
The requirement that the burden be essential, the "least-restrictive-means" component, defines the level of abstraction at which the free exercise question is asked. It is not
the state's interest in the legislative scheme as a whole, but rather the state's interest in not
providing an exemption from that scheme, which is decisive. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. One
commentator has proposed a "choice of law" approach for assessing the strength of the
state's interest relative to that of the religious authority. See generally Note, supra note 104.
This highly instructive analogy would weigh the interests of a religious "jurisdiction" or
authority against the interests of the secular jurisdiction or authority under rules similar to
those of present conflict-of-laws doctrine.
Viewed in such a manner, the principle involved in free exercise clause cases is not
unlike that involved in the myriad of instances in which one sovereign is obliged to give due
respect to the "law" or jurisdiction of another sovereign. Such questions of comity and
deference and of "choice of law" have arisen frequently in American law; often as a consequence of our system of cooperative federalism which requires that, in a variety of contexts,
the claims or potential claims to authority by competing sovereigns be reconciled in a way
that preserves the integrity and interests of each. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302 (1981) ("Full Faith and Credit" and "due process" limitations of choice-oflaw); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971) (abstention); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts in diversity
apply state substantive law); cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105
S. Ct. 1005, 1021-33 (1985) (Powell,J., dissenting) (tenth amendment); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416-37 (1964). This rationale also explains why recognition of a legitimate free exercise claim does not discriminate infavor of some religion and
thereby depart from the principle of equality. Free exercise claims are not granted out of
any preference for the ethical norms or convictions of religious persons, but simply out of
recognition of the existence of a "legally" heterogenous world in which certain standards of
comity (like the first amendment's respect for religion) apply. See Note, supra. To respect
equally the laws and jurisdiction of other sovereigns is not favoritism.
174 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), provides a useful example. See notes 11321 supra and accompanying text.
One criticism of Yoder might be that, in providing an exemption on free exercise
grounds to Amish parents from compulsory school attendance laws, the Supreme Court
bestowed upon the parents a unique status because of their religion, a result which the
Court's establishment clause analysis would forbid in any other circumstance. Under an
equal protection model, the Court could approach the case from either direction. First, as
the Court's opinion indicates, Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance laws had a unique
detrimental effect on the Amish system of religious life. Although the state had a compelling interest in mandatory education, that interest did not require the inclusion of the
Amish, whose alternative system could accomplish for its people a functional nearequivalent. Thus, the state could notjustify its more intrusive means of achieiving its compelling interest. Looked at from the establishment side of the coin, permitting an exemption
on religious (and no other) grounds is an explicitly religious classification, but one which is
justified by the compelling interest of accommodating the free exercise of religion and by
the narrowly-tailored nature of the exemption, both of which serve to minimize entanglement and to closely fit the asserted interest.
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aid" to religion. The former involve situations when government
"speaks"; the latter, when government "spends."
A.

Symbolic Accommodation Cases
In each of the past three Terms, the Supreme Court has decided one important case involving symbolic uses of religion:
17 7
Marsh v. Chambers,175 Lynch v. Donnelly, 176 and Wallace v. Jaffree,
each of which has been discussed earlier in this article.' 78 Rather
than examine each individual case further, it is more worthwhile
here to focus on the most interesting doctrinal developments occurring in those cases-Justice O'Connor's "message of endorsement" approach-in order to compare it with the equal protection
approach outlined above.
Justice O'Connor, in concurring opinions in Lynch andJaffree,
has put the best light to date on the three prongs of Lemon, proposing that the "purpose" and "effect" tests be understood as asking
whether the intent or result of a given policy is to communicate a
message of state endorsement or disapproval of some religion or
religious practice.' 7 9 Aside from being phrased in the disjunctive, a
fault which it shares with the present Lemon test,' 8 0 O'Connor's approach is quite apt for cases involving state symbolic uses of religion, and it is perhaps no accident that it was developed in the
context of such cases. The usefulness of this approach, however,
may also be limited to such cases, since O'Connor's analysis focuses
narrowly on the question of whether government has made religion
"relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political
8
community."' '
While Madison's early version of the religion clauses did state
that "[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship,"1 82 this language was not adopted. Even if
one interprets the change in language as only eliminating redundancy and not as a rejection of the principle involved, the history
surrounding the adoption of the first amendment suggests that the
touchstone of the religion clauses was more the securing of religious liberty and equality from governmental interference than the
protection of the political status of religious persons. The former
principle, broadly conceived, probably encompasses the latter. The
175 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
176 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
177 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
178 See text accompanying notes 89-93, 135-51 supra.
179 Jafree, 105 S. Ct. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Lynch, 104 S.
Ct. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
180 See text accompanying notes 149-52 supra.
181 104 S. Ct. at 1366 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
182 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 54, at 434. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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shortcoming of O'Connor's approach is that the tail of equal political status wags the dog of equal title to religious liberty. In fact,
she goes further and reads the establishment clause as conferring
rights associated with one's status in the political sphere rather than
the religious sphere. This dramatic shift in emphasis takes
O'Connor out onto an insecure doctrinal limb in claiming that "the
effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require
invalidation of a government practice merely because it in fact
causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of
183
religion."
The model proposed in this article focuses less specially and
exclusively on whether government is communicating endorsement
or disapproval of some religion and more generally on whether
government policy creates inequalities in the exercise of religious
liberty, of which symbolic endorsement or disparagement of some
religious perspective through state speech may be one instance.
O'Connor's proposed revision of the Lemon test is best thought of
as a "special case" of the equal protection model, applicable in
cases where the challenged activity is governmental "speech" asserted to be of a symbolic and religious nature and where the asserted "effect" on religious exercise is the communication of a
18 4
symbolic message.
So conceived, the "endorsement" approach is a useful lens
through which to view the "symbolic accommodation" cases and a
practical way of explaining how the equal protection model would
work in those cases: Neither a creche nor a legislative chaplaincy
abridges the religious liberty of the nonadherent through either
compulsion or inducement, and these symbolic uses of religion do
not themselves communicate a message of disapproval of such
nonadherence. An individual's subjective sense of personal affront
or "psychic injury" alone is insufficient to invalidate such symbolic
accomodations of religion. The different result inJaffree is readily
explained by the Court's sense (more intuitive than analytical) that,
unlike the activity at issue in Lynch and Marsh, the Alabama statute
did in fact communicate a message of state disapproval of those
children (such as IshmaelJaffree's) who did not wish to engage in a
religious exercise during the "moment of silence" provided expressly for that purpose. 8 5
183 104 S. Ct. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184 Cf notes 83 and 108 supra.
185 The only difference between the "endorsement" and equal protection approaches is
that, under the equal protection model, evidence of an intention to communicate a message
of endorsement would invoke strict scrutiny of the action taken in order to determine
whether such a message was in fact communicated, rather than automatically invalidating
the action. See text accompanying notes 149-52 supra. This difference makes the holding in
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The Coin of Caesar

Of course, state policies may have effects on religious liberty
even absent any "message of endorsement" as, for example, when
dollars are involved. The coin of Caesar doubtless has symbolic
power in and of itself,1 86 but it is more often the financial effect of
tax payments (or of receipt of governmental benefits) on religious
exercise and church-state relations that is the real matter at issue.
The financial benefit/burden cases illustrate the equal protection model in an especially interesting way. Courts often replicate
at a second level the analytic error which is made in interpreting the
religion clauses in the first place. As argued above, the labeling of a
case as a "free exercise" or "establishment" case may presage an
outcome and serve as a substitute for consideration of the actual
overall effect. In an identical way, the words "subsidy" or "benefit"
tend to signal which way a court is deciding the case; they do not
provide for principled analysis.
The Supreme Court, for example, has at times characterized
tax exemptions as laudable government abstention from demanding that the church render tribute unto Caesar and at other times
characterized such exemptions as vicarious subsidization of religious enterprises. 187 Tax exemptions, credits, deductions, and direct grants alike become, with sufficient verbal acrobatics or
accounting ledgerdemain, either "subsidies" of religion or different
forms of "abstinence" from imposition of an oppressive scheme of
88
religious taxation. 1
If it is true, as Justice Douglas maintained, that "[t]he most effective way to establish any institution is to finance it,"189 it is
equally true that the most effective way for the modern state to disparage any institution is to deny it financial benefits to which others
Jaffree questionable. If, for example, Alabama's legislators, acting with the most sectarian
religious motives imaginable, nonetheless enacted a law that succeeded only in providing a

reasonable and noncoercive accommodation of religion, the Court should not have held the
law unconstitutional. However, the evidence seems to indicate that the implementation of
the law at issue inJaffree was not neutral in its effects on religious exercise. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
at 2484 n.23. These effects would probably not survive the test of strict scrutiny.
186

See, e.g., 11Mark 12:16.

187 Compare Walz, 397 U.S. at 675 ("The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship. . . .There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion.") with Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 591 ("[T]he very fact of the exemption or
deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect or vicarious
'donors.' "). See also Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983).
188 See generally Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and the Constitution, 78 YALE Lj. 1285, 1287 n. 11
(1969) ("[T]here is more than one way to skin a cat. . . .Let me write the technical provisions of the tax law, and I care not who eliminates its exemptions.").
189 Abington, 374 U.S. at 229 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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are entitled as a matter of course.19 0 If the establishment and free
exercise clauses are two sides of a single coin of religious liberty,
taxation and the receipt of government benefits are similarly two
parts of a unified system of government policy.
The seminal example is Sherbert v. Verner,' 9 1 where the Court
held that a state could not deny unemployment compensation to a
Seventh-Day Adventist whose religious objections to Saturday work
led to her unemployment. The state argued that she lacked "good
cause" for failing to accept suitable work. But, said the Court, Mrs.
Sherbert was effectively put to a choice between "abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion" and "forfeiting benefits."' 9 2 Collecting a long line of cases, the Court declared that "[i]t is too late in
the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or
privilege."' 9 3 Under the Court's free exercise analysis, then, it matters little whether the policy in question creates a burden or withholds a benefit. In this age of the affirmative state 94 and
"unconstitutional conditions,' ' 19 5 unemployment compensation,
tax exemption, and scores of other policies of the fisc are now, for
better or worse, quasi-entitlements, the deprivation of which for reasons of religious belief, affiliation, or profession is the functional
96
equivalent of a tax imposed on the free exercise of religion.'
1 97
The Court reaffirmed this view in Thomas v. Review Board,
holding, by a vote of 8 to 1, that
[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies
such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief,
thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
190 Ironically, it was Justice Douglas himself who expressed this view in his concurrence
in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 532, 536 (1958):
If the Government may not impose a tax upon the expression of ideas in order to
discourage them, it may not achieve the same end by reducing the individual who
expresses his views to second-class citizenship by withholding tax benefits granted
others. When government denies a tax exemption because of a citizen's belief, it
penalizes that belief.
191 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
192 Id. at 404 (emphasis added). See also id at 406 ("[T]o condition the availability of
benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.") (emphasis added).
193 Id. at 404.
194 The phrase is Professor Tribe's. See L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-1, at 812.
195 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404-05 n.6 (collecting authorities) (provides examples of"conditions and qualifications upon governmental privileges and benefits which have been invalidated because of their tendency to inhibit constitutionally protected activity"). See also
notes 230-60 infra and accompanying text.
196 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 ("[S]uch a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship.").
197 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement
upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial. 98
Accepting all this as given, it is absurd for establishment clause
analysis to retain as dispositive the same benefit/burden distinction
which free exercise doctrine has dismissed as irrelevant. The equal
protection approach to the financial "aid" cases erases the lines arbitrarily drawn between "benefit" and "burden" in the same way
that it erases the artificial line between the establishment and free
exercise clauses. With only the slightest of modifications, the above
quoted rule of Thomas can (and should) be cast in matching establishment clause terms:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon [some exercise in expression of] religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of [the absence of some exercise
of religion], thereby putting substantial pressure on [a
non]adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a
burden upon religious liberty exists. While this compulsion
may be indirect, the infringement upon [the freedom not to exercise that religion or any religion] is nonetheless substantial.
Courts must consider the financial relationship created by
some government policy as a whole in terms of its impact on religious exercise and nonexercise. The form of the financial benefit is
relevant only for the light that it sheds on the substantive effects of
the plan, and, as a prophylactic side-constraint guarding against
that excessive entanglement which threatens religious freedom.
1.

Credits, Deductions, and Vouchers: A Case
Study of Inconsistency

In Mueller v. Allen,19 9 the Supreme Court upheld, by the narrow
margin of one vote, the validity of a Minnesota statute permitting
taxpayers to deduct from their tax bill a portion of tuition and other
expenses incurred in educating their children at the primary and
secondary school levels. In holding that the Minnesota statute survived all three prongs of the Lemon test, the Court precariously distinguished Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist,20 0 decided ten years earlier, in which the Court had, by a
vote of 6 to 3, struck down a New York statute providing for tuition
tax "credits." First, the Court drew a distinction between Nyquist's
"tax credit" plan and the "genuine tax deduction" scheme of Mueller.20 1 Second, the Court found that the plan in Mueller afforded
198
199
200
201

450
463
413
463

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 717-18.
388 (1983).
756 (1973).
at 396-97 n.6.
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benefits to a potentially broader cross-section of the population 202
than did the law in Nyquist, which granted tax benefits only to par203
ents of private school children.
The distinctions exalt form over substance and are difficult to
rationalize as anything other than a valiant (and successful) attempt
at judicial coalition-building. 20 The differences between deduction
plans and credit plans are insignificant when compared to the
largely equivalent effects that each scheme is likely to have on religious exercise-the matter really at issue. 205 Mueller suggests less
that the technical arrangements of Nyquist were inadequate than
that the establishment clause tests which permit constitutional validity to turn on such technical niceties are themselves inadequate. 20 6 Approached from the standpoint of equal protection of
religious freedom, the distinctions drawn between Nyquist and Muel202 The Court deemed unimportant the fact that 96% of the actual benefits of the program in fact went to parents of children attending private sectarian schools, a higher percentage than in Nyguist. "[T]he fact that private persons fail in a particular year to claim the
tax relief to which they are entitled ... should be of little importance in determining the
constitutionality of the statute permitting such relief." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401. See also
Nyquist, 415 U.S. at 804 (Burger, C.J., dissenting in part).
203 ANyquist, 413 U.S. at 761-62.
204 Justice Powell wrote for the 6-3 majority in Nyquist. ChiefJustice Burger and Justices
White and Rehnquist dissented in the part dealing with tuition tax credits. Rehnquist's dissent was especially critical of the Court's disposition of the case. It is likely that Rehnquist,
who wrote for the Court in Mueller, along with Burger and White, would have been willing
to overrule Nyquist. Justice O'Connor's vote to uphold the state law in Mueller replaced
Justice Stewart's vote to invalidate the law at issue in Nyquist. Powell's switch, providing the
crucial fifth vote, undoubtedly accounts for the narrowness of the Court's opinion, which
strains to distinquish Mueller from Aryquist while asserting the continued vitality of the latter.
205 See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 411-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (majority's differentiation of
credits and deductions "a distinction without a difference. . . . It was precisely the substantive impact of the financial support and not its particular form, that rendered the programs
in Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon unconstitutional."). Both the majority and the dissenters in
Nyquist agreed that the degree of religious "effect" of a particular tax benefit bears little
relation to the form in which the benefit is cast. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786 ("Whether the
grant is labeled a reimbursement, a reward, or a subsidy, its substantive impact is still the
same."); id. at 810 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("Regardless of what the Court chooses to call
the New York plan, it is still abstention from taxation, and that abstention stands on no
different theoretical footing... from any other deduction or exemption currently allowable
for religious contributions or activities.") (footnote omitted).
It is even more difficult to distinguish the Court's far-reaching language in JN\vquist:
[I]t is precisely the function of New York's law to provide assistance to private
schools, the great majority of which are sectarian. By reimbursing parents for a
portion of their tuition bill, the State seeks to relieve their financial burdens sufficiently to assure that they continue to have the option to send their children to
religion-oriented schools. And while the other purposes of that aid.. . are certainly unexceptionable, the effect of that aid is unmistakably to provide desired
financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.
Id. at 783 (footnote omitted). In sum: ANvquisl and Mueller cannot realistically be distinguished on substantive grounds.
206 Cf. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (establishment clause analysis not a "legalistic minuet in
which precise rules and forms must govern").
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er make no difference. Either arrangement is constitutionally
proper.
To label tuition tax credits as "aids to religion" badly
prejudges the question, especially given the financially disadvantageous situation of private and religious schools when compared to
state-financed public schools. Education is "free" and available to
all on an equal basis, but conditioned upon a willingness to abandon the constitutional right to educate one's children in a religious
atmosphere or in accordance with religious doctrine. 20 7 The financial burdening of a constitutional right intimately associated with
religious liberty raises a serious free exercise objection. A persuasive case can be made that burdening religious education in such a
manner is impermissible discrimination against a key component of
religious liberty. Approached de novo from a religious liberty perspective, the startling suggestion is that subsidization of alterna20 8
tives to state-run education may be constitutionally required.
What should prove far easier to establish (and to accept politically) is that the Constitution permits the state to take steps to remedy the financial inequality confronting those choosing between
state-run and religious education. Judicial inquiry should be directed toward making sure that the overall effect of government
policy does not impermissibly tilt the financial scales involved in
making the decision of whether or not to attend a religious
20 9
school.
A system of tuition tax credits easily falls within the range of
the permissible. Such plans closely fit the need to counteract the
deleterious effect on religious liberty provided by the lack of such a
plan, 2' 0 while permitting the maximum degree of religious voluntarism. The financial benefits bestowed do not depend on what kind
of private school is chosen and are determined by personal parental
decisions as to which schools their children will attend, not by deci207 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See also text accompanying notes
193-96 supra and note 210 infra.
208 See generally R. MCCARTHY, supra note 60. The argument that subsidized alternatives
to public education are constitutionally required is not yet taken seriously, more because of
the widespread and habitual acceptance of the institution of public schools than because of
some flaw in the argument's legal reasoning.
209 See Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State: Tuition Tax Credits, 92
HARV. L. REV. 696, 700-01 (1979).

210 In Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-96, as in Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773, the Court found an
appropriately secular legislative purpose for the tuition tax benefit plan in "promoting diversity" and in "advancing the general quality of education." A more honest and realistic
approach recognizes the propriety of a secular legislative purpose in accommodating the
free exercise of religion. See text accompanying notes 122-34 supra. Thus, the attempt to
remove the extra burden placed on individuals who must subsidize a public school system
while sending their children to private religious schools might constitute a proper secular
legislative purpose. See Note, supra note 209, at 700-01.
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sions of the government. The means by which the financial benefit
is bestowed minimizes church-state entanglement, a consideration
21
which the Court in Mueller found important. '
Tuition tax credit arrangements provide funds on the basis of a
religious group's underlying support in a way that, in the words of
the Court in Zorach v. Clauson,2 12 "lets each flourish according to the
zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma."2 13 The affirmative accommodation of the means of choice, far from threatening a
government "establishment" of official religion, permits the
broadest possible free exercise of all, while impairing the free exercise and nonexercise rights of none.
2.

Other Forms of School-Aid: Entanglements
Real and Imagined

If the distinctions between Mueller and Nyquist rested on arcane
differences of form, the distinctions produced in a long line of
2 14
school-aid cases dealing with various in-kind grants and loans

carry this practice a few steps further. The Supreme Court's prolix
opinions in these cases reveal the deep divisions that have led it to
draw razor-thin distinctions, and also, to the Justices' frustration
with the factual peculiarities on which disparate results are often
2 15
forced to turn.
The Court missed an opportunity to clarify the issues in companion cases decided last Term, Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball21 6 and Aguilar v. Felton.2 17 The cases involved similar challenges to state and federal programs, respectively, which provided
supplemental and remedial educational services to children at both
public and private schools. The purposes of the programs were undeniably secular. After experimenting with a number of arrangements, the educational authorities in each case found that these
programs worked best, educationally (and least expensively), when
211 463 U.S. at 388. The Court did not, however, think this factor was controlling. Id.
212 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
213 Id. at 313.
214 See note 30 supra.
215 See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (opinion of Burger, CJ.); id. at
255 (opinion of Brennan,J.); id. at 256 (opinion of Marshall, J.); id. at 264, 265 (opinion of
Stevens, J.) (The lines drawn "should not differentiate between direct and indirect subsidies, or between instructional materials like globes and maps on the one hand and instructional materials like textbooks on the other."); but see id. at 262, 263 (opinion of Powell, J.)
("Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often must seem arbitrary. . . .Our
decisions have sought to establish principles that preserve the cherished safeguard of the
Establishment Clause without resort to blind absolutism. If this endeavor means a loss of
some analytical tidiness, then that too is entirely tolerable."). See geerallyJafree, 105 S. Ct.
2479, 2508 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
216 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
217 105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985).
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the publicly-funded teachers, rather than the students, did the
travelling and instruction was provided during the normal school
21
day at a student's home school. 1
The crux of the dispute was entanglement-oriented. The spectre challenged as unconstitutional was the presence of public
school teachers in private school classrooms. This was thought
either to advance religion impermissibly or to require excessive
"entanglement" to make certain such teachers remained religiously
neutral. The Court struck down the program in Felton squarely on
entanglement grounds.
Grand Rapids was nominally decided on the "effects" prong, but
in a manner that seems startlingly disingenuous and result-oriented. The Grand Rapids Court relied on Meek v. Pittenger,219 in
which it had struck down similar programs on the rationale that the
pervasively religious atmosphere at the religious schools might lead
publicly-funded "auxiliary services" instructors to modify their
teaching in order to mesh with the sectarian education their pupils
were otherwise receiving. The requirement that the publicly supported teachers remain "religiously neutral" was thought to require "continuing surveillance" of an entangling nature, 220 despite
recognition that inadvertent fostering of religion was unlikely to occur in remedial arithmetic classes and the like. According to Meek,
"[t]he State must be1 certain . . . that subsidized teachers do not
22
inculcate religion."
The Supreme Court should have recognized a difference between Meek and Grand Rapids in the experience of the latter program's actual operation. The undisputed facts in both the Grand
Rapids and Felton cases showed that the dreaded effects of Meek
proved but constructs ofjudicial imagination-there was absolutely
no evidence, from programs in operation for several years, of any
tendency toward state inculcation of religion. 22 2 Indeed, even the
"effects" noted by the majority were admittedly speculative 2 23 and
218

105 S. Ct. at 3218-20.

219 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
220 421 U.S. at 372.
221 421 U.S. at 369 (quoting Early v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
222 See Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also notes 223-25 infra
and accompanying text.
223 Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3223-24 (emphasis added):
First, the teachers participating in the programs may become involved in intentionally or inadvertently inculcating particular religious tenets or beliefs. Second, the
programs may provide a crucial symbolic link between government and religion
r.
the programs may have the effect of directly promoting religion by
... Third,
impermissibly providing a subsidy to the primary religious mission of the institutions affected.
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unsupported by the evidence. 2 24 Undaunted, 22 5 the Court concluded that improper effects might nonetheless be present and,
therefore, struck down the entire program.
The Court's opinion in Felton made clear, however, that even if
steps were taken to safeguard against these supposed evils, such
steps themselves would render the program unconstitutional on entanglement grounds. 2 26 The "Catch-22" nature of the Court's
opinions was not lost on the dissenters. 2 27 Grand Rapids and Felton
reveal that at present a majority ofJustices simply oppose most direct forms of government aid to private schools, and, that the Lemon
test can be manipulated (in apparent disregard of the facts) in order
to support such opposition-even where the Court can adduce no
harmful effects on religious liberty.
Amidst the abundant chaff in Grand Rapids and Felton opinions,
the small grain of merit in the Court's decisions might tend to be
lost: Programs of direct aid of any sort necessarily involve greater
entanglement problems than programs such as that upheld in Mueller, where partial financial reimbursement for educational expenses
was furnished to students indirectly, with the state remaining a discreet distance from the religious school. Under the equal protection model, where there is a less entangling means of attaining the
state's objective, that means may not only be strongly preferred,
but in some instances required. 2 28 The Court's decision in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, striking down direct salary supplements to teachers in
private religious schools, provides a good example, since programs
of the sort upheld in Mueller provide a less-entangling way of seeking to narrow discrepancies between state support for education in
the public and private sectors.
The Grand Rapids and Felton programs, however, differ markedly from the program at issue in Lemon. The former two programs
were intended not to equalize differences in government support
for private and public education, but to provide supplementary educational services to those whom the governments felt were in need
of it, wherever they may have chosen to attend school. Moreover,
the decisionmakers involved found that alternatives to on-site instruction were educationally impractical. Thus, there appears to
have been no "less-entangling means" of attaining the governments' purely secular objectives. Under the equal protection
224
dents
225
226
227
nying
228

Grand Rapids, 105 S. Ct. at 3225 ("The Court of Appeals ... recognized that responadduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious indoctrination in this case.").
Id. ("But the absence of proof of specific incidents is not dispositive.").
See Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3237.
Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3243 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). See note 164 supra and accompatext.
See text accompanying notes 171-72 supra. See also notes 173 and 208 supra.
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model, the programs at issue in Grand Rapids and Felton would be
upheld. The Court's decisions to the contrary are doctrinally and
factually unsupportable2 29and-in human and educational termsnothing short of tragic.

3. Bob Jones University: Racism Obscures Reason, Passion
Obscures Principle
As a doctrinal matter, the controversial case of Bob Jones University v. United States2 30 illustrates both the intertwined nature of the

two religion clauses and the chimercial nature of a benefit/burden
distinction. As a practical matter, the outcome of the case had little
to do with legal principles, and a great deal to do with politics, policy, and passion. Nonetheless (or perhaps therefore), the case merits close examination.
Bob Jones University is a private school, with students ranging
from kindergarten to graduate school, whose religious nature is so
pervasive and peculiar that the district court found that it constituted its own religious order. 23 1 One of the University's religious

tenets forbids interracial dating or marriage. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) revoked the University's tax exempt status 232 on the
ground that such a practice was racially discriminatory and against
public policy. Bob Jones University sued, arguing that the IRS's
decision not only violated its right to the free exercise of religion
but also violated the establishment clause by favoring some religious exercises and disfavoring others. The arguments really
amounted to two different ways of saying the same thing: Selective
withdrawal of tax-exempt status from a religious organization 233 because of the repugnancy of that organization's tenets and membership practices violates the religious liberty protected by the first
amendment's religion clauses. The Supreme Court's decision,
holding against Bob Jones University's first amendment claims,
cannot withstand analysis in terms of the equal protection model or
the chain of precedents from which that model is derived.
The rule of decision involved in Bob Jones University can be
229 See Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3248 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
230 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
231 Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 894-95 (1978).
232 The University had held tax exempt status under IRC § 501(c) (3) which provides
that "[c]orporations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable ... or
educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemptions. 461 U.S. at 585.
233 Although the Court attempted to limit its decision to "educational" organizations
only, as distinct from "religious" organizations, 461 U.S. at 604 n.29, the force of the holding cannot be so confined. The Court itself noted that "Itihe record in this case leaves no
doubt, however, that Bob Jones University is both an educational institution and a religious
institution." Id. at 605-06 n.32 (emphasis added). The District Court expressly found that
Bob Jones University's "primary purpose is religious and that it exists as a religious organization for purposes" of § 501(c)(3). 468 F. Supp. at 895.
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thought of in either of two ways: (1) All nondiscriminatory religious organizations are entitled to tax-exempt status; or (2) All religious organizations are entitled to tax-exempt status, but certain
religious groups will have this status revoked because their religious dogma either sanctions or compels discriminatory practices
and is therefore considered unacceptable. The former rule sounds
more "neutral" than the latter, but they are the same rule. At the
very least, the validity of the first amendment claim should not turn
upon which formulation is chosen. The legal analysis in either case
is the same.
ChiefJustice Burger's opinion for the Court cast Bob Jones University as an easy "Rule 1" case. Placing the gloss of common law
charitable trust doctrine over section 501(c)(3), the Court found
the provision of a "public benefit" to be a precondition for a tax
2 34
exemption:
[I]t cannot be said that educational institutions that, for
whatever reasons, practice racial discrimination, are institutions
exercising
"beneficial and stabilizing influences in community
life." 235
In effect, the Court held that the IRS may exercise the power to
decide which religious beliefs and practices are beneficial influences
on the community and which ones are not. 23 6 Incredibly, the Court
quoted Walz completely out of context for this proposition when, in
fact, Walz expressly disclaimed a "public benefit" theory for justifying tax exemption of religious organizations. 23 7 The rationale
upon which the Court upheld the New York statute in Walz was that
tax-exemption seeks to protect free exercise, foster diversity, and
234 461 U.S. at 586-92.
235 Id. at 595 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
236 Cf. Cover, The Supreme Court 1981 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1983). Professor Cover argues that, by finding mere "public policy" to prevail over
a free exercise claim rather than addressing the question of whether the fourteenth amendment prohibitedany Congressional grant of tax-exemption to racially discriminatory institutions, the Court vindicated authority "without the expression of judicial commitment to
principle that is embodied in constitutional decision." Id. at 66-67.
237 Wak, 397 U.S. at 673. The Court in Walz noted two distinct purposes for New York's
exemption. First, the state had an "affirmative policy" that considered these groups "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life." Id. Such a theory was thought an inappropriate justification for the exemption of religion. Rather, tax exemption of religion was
justified as a policy to insure religious neutrality. Noting that governments "have not always
been tolerant of religious activity," the Court recongized that "grants of exemption historically reflect the concerns of authors of constitutions and statutes as to the latent dangers
inherent in the imposition of property taxes; exemption constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against these dangers." Id. Cf. Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 606,
609 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Far from representing an effort to reinforce any perceived
'common community conscience,' the provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups is
one indispensable means of limiting the influence of governmental orthodoxy on important
areas of community life.").
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minimize governmental interference by avoiding precisely the kinds
of situations that the Bob Jones University case represents: use of the
tax code and an organization's exempt status as weapons with
which that group's religiously-based practices and beliefs2 38 are
subjugated to other goals of government.
The Supreme Court's strained interpretation of the statute, in
at least apparent conflict with its approach in other religion clause
cases, 239 forced consideration of Bob Jones University's constitutional arguments. Even if the IRS rule were neutral in formulation,
the failure to exempt organizations which practice racial (or, for
that matter, sexual 240 ) discrimination in their membership practices
because of religious belief is acutely problematic. Strict scrutiny of
the IRS action seems appropriate however one frames the IRS's
238 The distinction made in earlier cases between belief and action, the former freedom
absolute and the latter regulable, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940),
has eroded in recent years with the Court's recognition that "belief and action cannot be
neatly confined in logic-tight compartments," Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. See McDaniel, 435 U.S.
at 631 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[A] sharp distinction cannot be made between religious belief and religiously motivated action .... "); L. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-8, at 838
(such a distinction is "more apparent than real").
The record of the Bob Jones University case shows little, if any, action apart from statements of belief. Blacks may be admitted to the University if they meet the University's other
requirements. The University engaged in no conduct apart from the making of a policy
statement that interracial dating and marriage was, in its view, contrary to the Bible and
morally wrong, and therefore would not be permitted among its students. See 468 F. Supp.
at 893-95.
239 In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), the NLRB asserted
jurisdiction over labor disputes involving private Catholic schools, issued a declaration that
these schools had violated the National Labor Relations Act, and ordered them to cease
unfair labor practices and bargain collectively with unions.
The Supreme Court avoided the constitutional question of whether such an order violated the religion clauses, prefering instead to construe the statute so as to exclude the
NLRB's jurisdiction over the employment policies and practices of religious schools:
[I]n the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent to bring teachers in
church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult
and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.
Id. at 507.
The Court's handling of Catholic Bishop stands in stark constrast to its treatment of Bob
Jones University. In both cases, an administrative agency had construed its authority broadly
to include matters pertaining to pervasively religious schools and had concluded that the
institution was acting contrary to national policy. In CatholicBishop, the Court had to strain
the meaning of the statute to avoid the possibility of even considering difficult first amendment religious freedom questions. In BobJones University, the Court had to strain the meaning of the statute to present the conflict with Bob Jones University's asserted first
amendment rights. See Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 612-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
240 Suppose, for example, that the Equal Rights Amendment were passed and the IRS
immediately revoked the tax-exempt status of the Catholic Church (or of all Catholic seminaries) because it found the Church's policy against ordination of women contrary to clear
national policy (or, Congress might by statute remove all "sex-discriminatory organizations" from § 501(c)(3) status). The Bob Jones University decision would appear to compel a
vindication of such governmental policy.
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rule of decision. The burden on religious liberty is clear and, in
monetary terms, dramatic. In essence, Bob Jones University was
fined nearly half a million dollars for enforcing upon consenting
students a disciplinary rule designed to implement an uncontestedly sincerely held religious belief.241 The word "fined" is used
advisedly here, for the situation is functionally identical to that
presented in Sherbert v. Verner.242 Like Mrs. Sherbert, Bob Jones
University was forced "to choose between following precepts of its
religion and forfeiting benefits." 243 Governmental imposition of
such a choice
puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion
as would a fine imposed against [Mrs. Sherbert] for her Saturday
worship. .

.

. [Clonditions upon public benefits cannot be sus-

tained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as244
to inhibit or
deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
That tax exemption is precisely such a "public benefit" is clear
from the Court's decisions in the twin cases of Speiser v. Randall 245
and First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 246 in which veterans and a
church, respectively, were required to sign loyalty oaths in order to
retain certain tax benefits. The Court found that such a requirement would have a coercive effect destructive of first amendment
freedoms, both of speech and of religion:247 "To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect
to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as
if the state were to fine them for this speech." 248 Central to the
Court's disposition of the two cases was the fact that they involved a
"discriminatory denial" of a tax exemption based upon failure to
conform in the content of one's secular or religious speech. 249
Given the power of the Court's language in Sherbert and Speiser, it is
hard to fathom how the Court could trivialize the burden on reli241 The BobJones University result is best explained by the fear that religion could be used
as a guise with which to cloak cases of otherwise naked racism. See note 260 infra. This fear
is probably not groundless, but in the Bob Jones University case there was an uncontested
finding that Bob Jones University's policy was based on a sincerely held religious belief.
468 F. Supp. at 894; 461 U.S. at 602-03 n.28.
242 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see text accompanying notes 113-14, 191-98 supra. See also note
257 infra.
243 See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
244 374 U.S. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
245 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
246 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
247 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526-27; see id. at 529 (Black,J, concurring) (denouncing statute as
"a tax on belief and expression"). See also note 190 supra (statement of Douglas, J.,
concurring).
248 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 518. Cf note 238 supra.
249 Id. at 518 ("It cannot be gainsaid that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for
engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech .... "). See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. at 716 ("More than 30 years ago, the Court held that a person may not be compelled
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gious freedom in Bob Jones University as one that "will inevitably have
a substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools,
but will not prevent those schools from observing their religious
tenets."250
(In this respect, the Bob Jones University case is a most distressing mirror-image of the old case of Berea College v. Kentucky. 25 1 In
Berea College, a Christian school felt compelled by religious doctrine
to adopt racial practices anathema to the "public policy" of the day:
Berea College admitted both black and white students without discrimination or segregation. A Kentucky statute prohibited maintenance of a racially integrated school or college. The Supreme
Courts of Kentucky and of the United States rebuffed the College's
contention that such a law infringed on its religious liberty, the latter holding that Kentucky's action was simply an entirely proper
25 2
alteration of a corporate charter by an act of the legislature. )
Whatever the Court's reasons for denying the fact, a burden on
religious liberty certainly was present in the Bob Jones University dispute, whether viewed as a "Rule 1" or a "Rule 2" case. The application of the IRS policy to the groups in question should therefore
require a compelling governmental interest not attainable through
any less restrictive means. The state interest asserted was that of
eliminating discrimination in education. The Bob Jones University
opinion equates the continuation of a broadly available tax exemp253
tion with "public support to racial discrimination in education,"
an appellation that sounds insincere in light of Walz and incoherent
in light of the decisions in Sherbert, Thomas, Speiser, and First Unitarian Church. The purported state interest thus was cast in entirely
question-begging terms. The governmental interest in not exempting
these religious groups from some taxation is not at all the same
thing as the "overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination
in education." 2 54 Moreover, revocation of Bob Jones University's
tax-exempt status hardly constitutes a close fit of classification to
the objective of discouraging racial discrimination. It far too imprecisely effectuates its purpose while singling out specific religious
to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program."); cf. text accompanying notes 191-98 supra.
The Speisier and First Unitarian Church cases are remarkably similar in principle to the
situation present in the BobJones University case and it is difficult to understand why none of
the Justices considered their weight. All nine Justices rejected the University's religion
clause claims. BobJones University, 461 U.S. at 602-05; id. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring); id.
at 622 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
250

Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 603-04.

251 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
252 Id. at 58.
253 461 U.S. at 604 n.29 (emphasis added).
254 Id. at 604.
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groups for unique deprivations due to their beliefs. 255
The exemption on free exercise grounds of religious persons
or organizations from rules of general applicability must, of course,
be subject to limits. 2 5 6 But when those limits are defined or applied

in a discriminatory, arbitrary, or simply haphazard manner, the establishment clause principle of equal protection of religious free
exercise is violated. The availability of a religiously based exemption cannot turn simply on a view of the relative merits or value of
the religious belief that conflicts with the secular norm. 25 7 To use

the Supreme Court's own words:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 258
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.
The selective withdrawal of tax-exempt status from an institution in an attempt to force that institution to abandon unorthodox
or distasteful religious beliefs and practices is a serious violation of
the establishment clause principle of equal protection of religious
freedom. The repugnancy of racism doubtlessly distorted the
,/

255 Cf. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 ("[W~e must searchingly examine the interests that the
State seeks to promote by its requirement.., and the impediment to those objectives that
would flow from recognizing the claimed... exemption.") (concerning an exemption from
compulsory education). The Court has stated this principle in terms resembling cost-benefit analysis in other first amendment cases involving rights of free speech and political association. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The gain to
the subordinating interest provided by the means must outweigh the incurred loss of protected rights .... "). Realistically, the gain to the interest of discouraging racial discrimination provided by revocation of Bob Jones University's tax-exempt status is negligible,
especially when contrasted with the burden it places on the University's free exercise rights.
256 A detailed examination of religious-based exemptions from otherwise valid laws is
beyond the scope of this article. See Note, supra note 104, for an excellent treatment of the
topic. Given the presence of a cognizable claim for exemption, this author's approach evaluates the weight of state interests by considering the effects of an exemption on third parties-those outside the religious "territory." See id. at 373-75. See also note 173 supra.
Under this standard, the propriety of Bob Jones University (which the district court found
to constitute a religious order) applying a disciplinary rule to its own member-students is
beyond question. The impropriety of IRS (or state) interference with such an internal policy (which policy had de minimis or nonexistent external effects) is equally obvious. See Note,
supra, at 375.
257 For example, there appears to be no principled reason for giving an exemption to
the Amish in Yoder but not to the religious believers in Bob Jones University. In each case, a
sincerely held religious practice conflicted with a compelling state interest. See Yoder, 406
U.S. at 213:
Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State . ...
[But] a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and
interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment. ...
258 West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Court's treatment of the religious liberty issue involved, and perhaps Bob Jones University will come to be regarded as sui generis. But
Bob Jones University portends the very real danger of stripping from
certain groups the "equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the dictates of conscience" 2 59 whenever the majority
260
finds those dictates of conscience utterly pernicious.
VI.

Conclusion: Beyond Witters and Bender

The Supreme Court cannot forever avoid facing up to the fundamental conflicts it has created in its religion clause jurisprudence.
Indeed, in the current Term, as this article goes to press, the Court
has been wrestling with cases that exemplify "equal protection of
religious freedom" problems. In its recent decision in Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind,26 1 the Court unanimously held that it was not a violation of the establishment clause
for a state to permit individuals to use state educational benefits in
the manner of their own choice, including for religious instruction.
The Washington Supreme Court had held that that state must deny
funds (provided under its vocational rehabilitation program for the
handicapped) to a blind man simply because he wanted to use those
funds to pursue a religious vocation. The unanimous reversal of
this decision is important for its holding that individuals utilizing
government financial benefits do not thereby become deputized as
agents of the state, their private decisions and actions somehow
equated with state decisions and state action. 2 62 Yet, the Court in
Witters skirted 2 63 what was arguably the more important issue:
259 See text accompanying notes 72 and 109 supra.
260 I must emphasize that I am with the majority in this respect. My abhorrence for the
religious views of Bob Jones University is, however, tempered with the suspicion that other
temporary majorities might, at some time or another, find my religious beliefs abhorrent.
Justice Jackson's famous words act as a counterweight to the views of those who would
allow righteous indignation to degenerate into religious intolerance: "[F]reedom to differ
is not limited to things that do not matter much. . . . The test of its substance is the right
to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
See also note 241 supra.

261 106 S. Ct. 748 (1986).
262 Id. at 751-52. ("For example, a State may issue a paycheck to one of its employees,
who may then denote all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and the State may do so even knowing that the employee so intends to
dispose of his salary."); id. at 752 ("In this case, the fact that aid goes to individuals means
that the decision to support religious education is made by the individual, not by the
State."); id. at 753 (benefit to religious school not the result of state action) ("Nor does the
mere circumstance that petitioner has chosen to use neutrally available state aid to help pay
for his religious education confer any message of state endorsement of religion.").
263 The court "decline[d]" to "leapfrog" the possibility that Washington's state constitution might require an even stricter separation, and address Witters' claim that the free
exercise clause "requires Washington to extend vocational rehabilitation aid to petitioner
regrardless of what the state constitution commands." Id. at 753 (emphasis in original). No
"leapfrogging" was necessary. The Washington Supreme Court had passed on Witters'
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Whether the state's attempted'exclusion of Mr. Witters from the
vocational rehabilitation program was not only not required by the
establishment clause, but in factforbidden by the religion clauses as
invidious governmental discrimination on the basis of an individ2
ual's exercise of his religious liberty. 6
The Court also managed to sidestep the central issue of equal
protection for religious expression in its very recent decision in
Bender v. Williamsport Area School District.26 5 In Bender, a small group
of high school students sought to meet for prayer, Bible study and
discussion during the school's designated "activity hour," on the
same terms as any other student-initiated and student-run group
activity. The Court granted certiorari to review the opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which had
upheld (2-1) the School District's content-based exclusion from a
limited public forum expressly created to accomodate student
"speech," on the ground that to permit religious speech would violate the establishment clause. 26 6 The Third Circuit opinion is perhaps the harshest of examples of establishment clause analysis gone
awry-promotion of "separation" even at the cost of the obvious
denial of equal protection of the free speech of religious students
because of the content of their speech. A more serious perversion of
the establishment clause as a guarantor of religious liberty and
equality is difficult to imagine.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of 5 to 4, deftly avoided the
merits, vacating the opinion of the Third Circuit on jurisdictional
grounds and reinstating the judgment of the district court (which
had ruled in favor of the students). The majority's disposition of
the case is unsatisfying and, given the unusual alignment of the Justices, 2 67 seems a mixture of jurisprudential rigor 26 8 and convenient
compromise: The students won the right to meet, but no national
free exercise claim, 102 Wash. 2d at 631, 689 P.2d at 57, the question was properly
presented in the petition for certiorari and arguably a necessary issue for Witters to win in
order for him to have any affirmative claim for relief. Moreover, in no circumstances can a
state constitutional provision defeat a federal constitutional right. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The Court beat a hasty retreat from the free exercise claim, but its decision to do so was
certainly not dictated by jurisprudential propriety.
264 Witters is an easy case under the equal protection model. Witters asked only that he
be accorded the same treatment as others similarly situated, and that his religious career
choice be respected as one which he was entitled to pursue. Plainly, there is no establishment clause problem in such equal treatment. Just as plainly, to single-out Witters for
exclusion from the vocational-aid program in these circumstances is an obvious denial of
equal protection with respect to religious exercise.
265 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986).
266 Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984).
267 Justice Stevens wrote for a majority that included Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmum, and O'Connor. ChiefJustice Burger andJustices White, Powell, and Rehnquist
dissented. The cynical observor might note that, with a few exceptions, theJustices who are
usually "conservative" onjusticiability issues were more "liberal" here, and several Justices
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precedent was set. The four dissenters would have reached the
merits and, based on Widmar v. Vincent, ruled in favor of the
students 269
In Bender, the Court passed up an excellent opportunity to untie, or at least loosen, the knots it has created in its religion clause
analysis, by making the straightforward observation that the establishment clause embodies a principle of equal liberty. Religionbased discrimination is never required by the first amendment but,
quite the contrary, is prohibited by it. In such contexts, the two
religion clauses are truly two sides of the same constitutional coin.
In his dissent in Thomas v. Review Board,2 70 Justice Rehnquist
charged that, "[b]y broadly construing both Clauses, the Court has
constantly narrowed the channel between the Scylla and Charybdis
through which any state or federal action must pass in order to surwho are usually "liberal" in permitting standing insisted that square corners be turned in
this case.
268 The Bender case makes intriquing law (for those intriqued by such things) on the
question of a defendant's standing to appeal from a declaratory judgment against him. RespondentJohn Youngman had originally been sued as one of the members of the Williamsport School Board. When the Board as a whole declined to appeal the district court's
ruling in favor of the students, Youngman appealed, arguably asserting his interest as a
parent of children in the Williamsport school system, not his school board status. See 106 S.
Ct. at 1333-34. Youngman would have had standing as a parent and apparently could have
filed a motion to intervene as of right, even after the district court judgment, for purposes
of prosecuting the appeal. Id. at 1335 n.9. Apparently, Youngman thought this avenue
unnecessary since he was already joined in the litigation as a party defendant. The problem
was that Youngman was sued in one capacity (as a school board member, representing its
interests) and appealed in another (parent, representing that interest). Moreover, the official record contained no "pleadings" concerning his standing as a parent. Id. at 1334. The
conclusion denying standing to Youngman is ironic, but seemingly correct as a technical
matter: A defendant who loses in one federal court and seeks to appeal that judgment may
nonetheless have to file a formal motion to intervene under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure if he seeks to maintain the appeal in a different capacity than that in which
he was originally sued.
269 Id. at 1336 (Burger, CJ.,joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1338
(Powell, J., dissenting). The majority made no mention of the merits at all. The dissents,
however, correctly stated that Bender is virtually indistinquishable from Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981). The most commonly urged distinction is that high school students are
more "impressionable" than college students, see id. at 1339 (Powell,J., dissenting), but it is
unclear in which direction this factor should cut. If an equal access policy is in fact neutral,
it would seem far less likely for the "impressionable" student to think that a neutral policy
implied school "endorsement" of religion than for him to think that a policy excluding only
religious clubs revealed school "disapproval" of religion.
In candor, the real "impressionability" objection has nothing to do with the fear of
state sponsorship, but only the fear that some students, exposed to the views of other students, will be influenced thereby. It would be tragic to adopt a view of the first amendment
which held that private speech must be suppressed wherever the potential audience may be
sufficiently open-minded or subject to impression as perhaps to be influenced in their opinions or beliefs by exposure to ideas different from their own, simply because these ideas
concern religion. See notes 78-88 supra and accompanying text.
270 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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vive constitutional scrutiny." 2 71 Rehnquist's dissent did not chal-

lenge the Court's far more questionable premise that the religion
clauses pull in opposite directions. Rehnquist apparently concedes
that church-state policies must steer between Scylla and Charybdis;
he would merely widen the channel.
It has been the goal of this article to challenge the validity of
this underlying metaphor. What needs changing is not so much the
breadth of the freedoms contained in the religion clauses as the
metaphor used to describe the relationship between them. This article began with an analogy between the religion clause dilemma
and the dilemma put to Jesus on the issue of paying tribute to Caesar. Christ's answer to the tax-payment question stunned His hearers precisely because it rejected the conventional understandings of
the day which would have forced Him to choose between unacceptable and, in a sense,false alternatives. Christ's answer suggested an
entirely new way of looking at the question, not a clever attempt to
avoid facing up to it.
It is past time for the Supreme Court to refuse the supposed
"dilemma" within the first amendment by giving the text, history,
and doctrine of the religion clauses a fresh look. It is hoped that
the proposal sketched in this article might advance the debate past
its present impasse by clarifying the common interests shared by
the religion clauses and by explicating the way in which the Court's
present doctrine might be reformulated to better reflect the objective of true neutrality toward exercise of religious liberty in all its
forms.
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Id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

